PERCEIVED LEVELS OF INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY, JOB INSECURITY AND SUPERVISOR CREDIBILITY: EFFECTS OF THE DRAWDOWN AMONG SOLDIERS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

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by

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The phenomenon of work force reductions via organizational decline can cause anxiety among workers (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981).

Furthermore, the threat of job insecurity will be exacerbated when individuals lack adequate information and can not predict or control the outcome of work force reductions (Brockner, 1988; Goldhaber, 1983; Greenhalgh, 1982).

The purpose of this study was to determine the level of job insecurity and anxiety among soldiers in the United States Army following the decision by Congress to reduce the active force by 25 percent.

In addition, the study explored the relationship between information uncertainty, job insecurity, and communicator credibility among soldiers and senior defense officials.

Two clusters of data surrounding job insecurity and source credibility were contained in a 1990 Army Times newspaper reader survey designed to measure how the changes sweeping through the military were affecting soldiers. The insecurity levels showed a very high percentage of soldiers fear for their jobs as a result of the projected cuts during the force drawdown.

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Two clusters of data surrounding job insecurity and source credibility were contained in a 1990 Army Times newspaper reader survey designed to measure how the changes sweeping through the military were affecting soldiers.

Insecurity levels showed a very high percentage of soldiers fear for their jobs as a result of the projected cuts during the force drawdown.

Interestingly, enlisted soldiers perceive the cuts as affecting them more than commissioned officers, but

overall, the study shows a majority of the force places very little trust and confidence in the ability of Army leaders to equitably distribute cuts among soldiers.

Service members believe personnel forced out as a result of the drawdown will be treated unfairly, regardless of what defense officials say.

An adversarial relationship emerged during the course of the study between high levels of job insecurity and low values of credibility among senior defense officials.

A lack of information by senior defense officials concerning the drawdown may be exacerbating anxiety levels among soldiers and running contrary to the Army's best interests.

PREFACE

The results of this study reflect the perceptions of soldiers in the United States Army prior to the deployment of soldiers in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in August 1991.

As a result, the study is a mere "snapshot" of a larger phenomenon and may not reflect the views of respondents today, or any other point in the post-war period. Caution should be exercised with any tendency to generalize from such findings.

Moreover, much of the writing for this study occurred prior to August 1991, possibly leaving parts of the text to appear outdated and not indicative of current trends.

In this regard, every effort has been made to obtain and present the very latest information regarding the drawdown.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

> On the one hand there is fear and regret for the
> loss of the whole ediface constructed through the
> ages, on the other is the passion for destruction.
>
> Leo Tols⋅ y
> War and Peace

No adage may be more relevant when describing the

future of the United States Army than the one above. Since

November 1989, the world has witnessed events of historic

magnitude. Fundamental reform and change in the Soviet

Union and eastern Europe have proceeded at a pace that few

could have predicted.

Just as the collapse of the Berlin Wall signified an

end to separate Germanys and a beginning to a new, united

Germany, it also signified an end to the Cold War, and with

that came a reduced need for forward-deployed American

forces in Europe. With communism failing in eastern Europe

and the Soviet Union, the very need for a strong United

States military became a paramount interest to members of

the United States Congress. Talks of a "peace dividend"

became the topic of debate among Congressional members.

The Congress argued that, with the reduced need for a strong

and powerful military, money could be saved by transferring

it from the Department of Defense to other societal and governmental programs. Reagan ideas of a 600-ship Navy, Star Wars, and Stealth bombers became popular targets on Congressional "hit lists." Base closures, both overseas and within the United States, became additional targets of "peace dividend" rhetoric.

Faced with unprecedented pressure for change, Congress demanded that the Pentagon develop proposals for troop-strength reductions to meet the anticipated reduced needs of the Armed Forces. All American intelligence agencies agreed that, in light of recent developments in eastern Europe, a strong, forward-deployed U.S. military presence in Europe was not as necessary as it once was. Many analysts argued during the preparation of the 1991 budget that a strong U.S. military force was necessary in other parts of the world to protect other areas of vital importance to national security. These areas included Central America, South America and the Middle East.

On August 3, 1990, amidst the political hankering about the nation's budget for the coming years, the United States military began an unprecedented deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. More than a year ago, General Carl Vouno, the Army chief of staff wrote:

> The Iran-Iraq War illustrated the intensity with which the developing world can now wage war. These two countries fought for nearly a decade, using sophisticated weapons, long-range missiles, chemical agents, heavy armored forces and a large

amount of artillery. The casualties exceeded 1 million. We cannot rule out future wars of this type. The United States must maintain the capability of protecting vital interests wherever they are threatened. That could mean confronting a fully equipped army in the developing world. (Vouno, 1990)

In the September 1990 edition of Army Focus, a document prepared to assist in the Army's efforts to inform its military students, the Army's position on the planned reduction was clear. Army Focus, published semiannually, provides a view of key issues facing the Army that are important to public debate. Each entry outlines an official Army position or policy on a subject of enduring importance or whose current relevance merits wide Army and public awareness. Of particular interest to this research is entry number 11, Maintaining Quality as the Army Builds Down:

The Army plans to substantially, but prudently, reduce its size in the next several years, adapting to changes in the international security environment and to U.S. fiscal constraints.

Over the past two years the Army has developed a plan to reshape today's Army for the 1990s and beyond. The plan's main objective is to reduce the size of the Total Force while preserving its quality and essential warfighting capabilities. The difficulties inherent in building down a professional volunteer force are significantly greater than those of past draftee Army demobilizations.

During the build down, the Army must maintain the capabilities for short notice strategic force projection that are essential for operations such as Just Cause and Desert Shield. Annual reductions greater than 35,000 would degrade essential military capabilities, cause extreme personal dislocations as fully qualified officers, NCOs, and Army civilian employees are involuntarily dismissed, and threaten to cripple the Army's ability to recruit and to retain

quality soldiers and leaders.

The Army plans to reduce its Active Component end strength by about 35,000 soldiers per year through the mid-1990's. While the impacts of reductions of this magnitude on soldiers, Army civilian employees, and their families will be substantial, they will be manageable.

The Army must simultaneously reduce its size and structure, and recruit young men and women with the correct skills and in sufficient numbers to man the force. The Army must also retain the correct skills and grades and maintain upward mobility through promotions and selection for schooling and command. Finally, the Army must provide an effective transition program and severance pay for those members of the all-volunteer force who will be unable to continue their Army careers.

The Army will honor its commitment to take care of its soldiers, civilian employees, and their families. The Army's plan enables it to manage change to this end while maintaining essential readiness and properly shaping the future force. ("Maintaining quality," 1990)

Thus the Army's position on the subject is clear: the Army will reduce the force by nearly 25 percent between now and 1995 and strive to maintain quality as the Army builds down.

According to the Army Times in a recent article, the drawdown may be doing an about-face. The December 10th, 1990 edition reports that reducing the force now could limit long-term Desert Shield deployment and force military action.

In a prediction by two key members of Congress, "the military drawdown, intended to reduce the active-duty force by 25 percent by 1995, may be delayed or even reversed to meet the demands of Operation Desert Shield" ("Drawdown

may," 1990).

"A commitment of a half-million troops to the Middle East was not something we had considered last summer when we decided to cut the military," said Senator Sam Nunn, D-GA, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "We are going to have to take another look at this and consider holding off on a major reduction in personnel if this might limit our options in the Persian Gulf. We will also have to consider whether an increase in personnel strength is warranted" ("Drawdown may," 1990).

Senator John Glenn, D-Ohio, went further, saying the Pentagon cannot carry out the Persian Gulf deployments while making the 100,000-member reduction in active-duty strength Congress ordered to be completed by October 1. "At a minimum, it appears we are going to have to delay the personnel reductions for at least a year," said Glenn ("Drawdown may," 1990), chairman of the Armed Services Committee's manpower and personnel subcommittee.

Glenn also said if the all-volunteer force cannot provide enough service members to meet the needs of Desert Shield, Congress could order a draft. But "the key issue is that we need to sustain a force in the Middle East without a draft," he said ("Drawdown may," 1990).

The Army and the Marine Corps face the greatest strain in meeting the personnel needs of Desert Shield. With 7 2/3 divisions either in Saudi Arabia or slated to arrive in early 1991, 34 percent of operational Army forces will be in the

Middle East. The Marine Corps has assigned half its active operating forces to the Persian Gulf region ("Drawdown may," 1990).

The talk of a possible draft is interesting to note in light of recruiting problems that have begun to surface. Early signs of declining interest in joining the Army are worrisome, according to Army officials. Manpower chiefs, while not prepared to rewrite their recruiting strategy, are beginning to wonder if the service will have enough recruits to sustain a prolonged deployment in the Middle East ("Recruiting drop," 1990).

Recent Army recruiting statistics include both good and bad news: The 1989 recruiting effort was a success, bringing 89,617 recruits into the army -- three percent more than the recruiting goal of 87,000 ("Recruiting drop," 1990). However, according to a recent report in the Army Times (10 December 1990), the past few months have brought hard times to recruiters. The number of men -- potential combat troops -- signing contracts to join the Army fell well short of recruiting targets in September, October and November, according to Army figures.

After at least three months of exceeding their goals for new accessions of men with no prior service, the Army has brought in significantly fewer new accessions over the last three months.

In August, 6,070 signed up, eight percent more than the goal of 5,596. But in September, the Army signed up 28

percent fewer than its goal: 5,760, compared with 7,347.
In October, the new accessions were 24 percent short of the
goal: 6,327 of 8,311. In November, the gap widened to 32
percent, with 4,103 signing up, compared with the Army's
target of 6,022 ("Recruiting drop," 1990).

Several factors are responsible for the alarming trend,
according to Army officials. Obviously, the deployment of
thousands of soldiers to Saudi Arabia in support of Desert
Shield is one factor. Another factor in the overall
recruiting shortfall is a drastic cut in the recruiting
budget. The Army had 5,700 recruiters in 1989. This year,
it has 4,900 ("Recruiting drop," 1990).

While alarming to Army officials at this point, the
severity of the shortfall could become critical if fighting
breaks out between the United States and Iraq. At this very
moment, regulations governing the Draft may possibly be
being dusted off for possible use.

What does this mean to the soldier in Saudi Arabia?
What does it mean to his officers, responsible for his
welfare and readiness? What does it mean to me?

Trying to make any sense out of the rhetoric and
thinking of our national leaders requires the interpreter
to be quite cognizant of the environmental uncertainty that
exists in our world today. Quite literally, the magnitude
of compressed changes in the structure of world-wide
security forces may be unprecedented in history. Events
such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait are only two examples of major political and doctrinal changes that are sweeping the world.

Unfortunate as it may be, the United States Army is caught up in the "eye" of these political "twisters" and the impact is being felt by all those who raised their right hand and swore allegiance to the flag. The only thing clear to many soldiers today is that their fate is uncertain, being held tenuously by forces much larger than can truly be appreciated.

A review of major headlines found on the front page of the Army Times reveals the unprecedented uncertainty facing soldiers around the world today: (Appendix B contains more headlines from the Army Times relevant to this study)

February 19, 1990:   "Congress cut forces more, budget
                      reductions may unhinge Pentagon plans."

March 12, 1990:   "Budget chicken: Soldiers suffer if Army
                      can't shift funds."

May 7, 1990:   "Deeper force outs? Secretary Stone:
                      Active Army may shrink to 500,000."

July 16, 1990:   "The Plan: how the Army will cut troops."

October 22, 1990:   "Majors board off: budget questions
                      delay meeting until 1991."

December 3, 1990:   "The force feels the pinch." "Voluntary
                      separations, retirements in air."
                      "Overseas tour freeze." "Holiday leave
                      zapped for trainees."

As can readily be seen, the aphorism "the only thing constant is change itself" is quite appropriate when describing the impact of recent events on the United States Army.

The rhetoric of the summer of 1990 continued to fuel soldier's uncertainties. Massive pull-outs from Europe began to take place while several stateside units were deactivated. The end of the Cold War meant success to the United States. But the realities of this success meant that the forces amassed during the Reagan years would have to be cut. Pink-slips were needed, the United States did not need such a large Army.

The uncertainty faced by the soldier today is at levels never before imagined. A year ago the United States Army was telling the soldier he was no longer needed in light of the reduced Soviet threat. Today the Army is telling the soldier he is needed beyond the expiration of his enlistment period. The magnitude of these changes leaves the soldier with only one certain thought, or: that if war comes, the drawdown after will be much easier to manage.

Conceptualization of the Study

In light of these recent events, the future remains uncertain for the soldier. He or she must continue to accept the political realities as they are presented. For the United States Army, they too must accept the orders and missions assigned to them. But the Army has additional responsibilities: one of which is to keep its soldiers informed about the events that are causing the Army to change its very nature.

In essence, the United States Army is an organization facing a large scale organizational change due to

significant exogenous pressures in both the political and strategic world, and our nation's own need to reduce fiscal expenditures. Communism has died and the Cold War has ended. The federal deficit, it is argued, can be better brought under control through reduced military spending due to what is perceived to be a "peace-dividend," resulting from the end of the Cold War.

Previous examples illustrate what is meant by large-scale organizational changes. For example:

When manufacturing companies such as General Motors find themselves unable to compete effectively in world markets, they implement a broad range of strategic, technological, structural, and human resource changes over a period of many years. After repeatedly earning mediocre returns, conglomerates such as General Electric dramatically shift strategic direction and alter many aspects of their structure and functioning. Telecommunications companies such as AT & T scramble to respond to consumers' wants as deregulation changes the ground rules for corporate success. Today, examples of large-scale organizational change can be found in virtually every sector of the economy, even now including organizations such as the United States Army.

As a starting point for this study, large scale organizational change is defined as: a lasting change of an organization that significantly alters its performance (Mohrman, Mohrman, Ledford, Cummings, Lawter, and Associates, 1989). According to the authors, this definition

comprises two important constructs: change in character and change in performance. The definition also specifies that the alterations are not temporary; rather, the organization becomes different and remains different.

One form of organizational change is organizational decline, a central focus of this study. Sutton (1990) offers a useful framework summarizing the fundamental changes most often considered during organizational decline.

Of particular interest to this research is the assessment that deterioration in environmental support typically leads to changes within declining organizations, specifically loss of financial resources and work force reductions. For example, primarily as a result of financial losses suffered by International Harvester between 1979 and 1983, management reduced the work force from 64,000 to 32,000 employees (Marsh, 1985). As applied to the United States Army, a loss of financial resources through the budgetary process will lead to a work force reduction in the Department of Defense of 25 percent by 1995.

According to Levine (1978), retrenchment politics dictate that organizations will respond to cut backs with a mix of espoused and operative strategies that are not necessarily consistent. He explains that when there is a wide divergence between the official pronouncements about the necessity for cuts and the actual occurrence of cuts, skepticism, cynicism, distrust, and noncompliance will dominate the retrenchment process and cut back management

will be an adversarial process. In 1990, the Army announced
their five-year plan to cut the active force by 25 percent.

Deterioration of Environmental Support for the Organization	Internal Consequences of Deteriorating Environmental Support	Ultimate Consequences of Profound Deterioration of Environmental Support
• k-type deterioration in external resource base • r-type deterioration in external resource base Deterioration of organization's image among key exchange partners	Loss of financial resources Work force reduction	Imminent organizational death

Figure 1. Framework of Change in Organizational Decline.
Deterioration in environmental support typically leads to
changes within declining organizations, specifically, loss
of financial resources and work force reductions.

Will the plan be met with the same skepticism, cynicism, and distrust as discussed above by Levine? This study will begin to look at these issues.

Furthermore, decreases in organizational funding and revenues threaten both leaders and members at lower hierarchical levels, according to Cameron and his colleagues (1988). Financially distressed organizations may use layoffs and other forms of work force reduction to reduce expenses, and may use other threatening cost-saving measures such as pay freezes, pay cuts, demotions, forced-early retirement, and involuntary separations.

The phenomenon of work force reductions via organizational decline can cause anxiety among workers. The loss of one's job can be threatening to workers. The threat is experienced as some degree of job insecurity, defined by Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984) as perceived powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job situation. Furthermore, the authors argue, workers react to job insecurity, and their reactions have consequences for organizational effectiveness. Employee morale, performance, and production rates have all been shown to be affected by anxiety experienced over the potential loss of one's job.

Although job insecurity per se has received little research, the more generic concept of security has been a prominent concern of organizational behaviorists and psychologists. One group of theorists has focused on security as a motivation theory (Maslow, 1954), while others

have focused on security as part of a personality theory (Blatz, 1966; Sullivan, 1964).

Amid this conceptual diversity, three lines of inquiry have emerged that have been particularly influential in shaping theory and research relevant to security in organizations. These lines of inquiry can be identified with the works of Maslow, Herzberg, and Super. Maslow's theory deserves special attention.

Maslow's need hierarchy was not conceived as a theory of behavior in an organizational context, but Maslow himself suggested its applicability to organizational settings: "We can perceive the expressions of safety needs . . . in such phenomenon as . . . the common preference for a job with tenure and protection" (1954, p. 87).

Maslow specifically defined safety needs as: security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear; from anxiety and chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits; strength in the protector; and so on.

This point of conceptualization becomes critical in my argument; for if soldiers are asked the following question: "I fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt my military career," and they answer in a majority of agreement, one could assume that the need for safety (as defined by Maslow) has not been met. If so, Maslow would argue other needs would not be met because of a person's inability to circumvent the need for safety (Maslow, 1954). The hierarchical nature of his theory dictates this.

A strong link exists between threat of job loss and anxiety (Staw, Sandelands, Dutton, 1981). Additionally, the relationship between job stress and anxiety is also well documented (Kahn, 1981). The argument is highly defensible then that one's fears over potential job loss can be attributed to the anxiety felt over such an occurrence in one's life. Carrying the logic one step farther allows the linkage between the threat of job loss to organizational decline as a result of reduced financial resources and the inability of the organization to adapt to an environmental niche (Greenhalgh, 1983).

A loss of financial resources is evidenced by the 25 percent cut being forced upon the Army by Congress in the government's efforts to trim military spending. The inability of the Army to adapt to an environmental niche as proposed by Greenhalgh (1983) is evidenced by the troop withdrawals of US Army personnel and material from US Army Europe (USAREUR).

The new environmental niche the Army is attempting to occupy is that of a strategic, quickly deployable force that can move freely throughout the world to wherever national security interests take them. In essence, it involves the doctrinal transformation from forward-deployed forces as in USAREUR, to stateside, continental United States-based (CONUS-based) forces capable of exerting worldwide pressure when so ordered.

Much smaller nuances of this transformation have been

underway for the past 10 years, with the Army reorganizing its Divisions with a new emphasis being placed upon "light" forces such as the reorganizing and reactivation of the 7th Infantry Division in Fort Ord, California and the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. Both are examples of significant doctrinal changes to prepare the US Army for possible changes in world security needs. Indeed, the 7th Infantry Division was instrumental in the successful invasion of Panama in December, 1989. The success of that mission was in part due to the rapid-deployment characteristic of smaller, "lighter" forces that are capable of short-notice deployment to locations throughout the world.

For communication students, a critical concern in the conceptualization of this study is the linkage between organizational and communication theory. For that, the works of Shannon and Weaver (1949), Klaus Krippendorf (1975), and Lee Thayer (1967) will provide invaluable insight. According to Thayer (1961), the exchange of information is the first need of all organized behavior. He argues that without information feeding into, through, and out of an organization, it would quickly collapse. The communication of information, then, is essential to the existence of any organization.

Thayer (1961) further argues that plans and decisions must be based upon information. Information about conditions of every sort -- economic, technological, labor,

regulatory, and so forth -- must be available to take into account in planning today's and next year's activities, and in setting goals and policies.

Shannon and Weaver (1949), in their work <u>The Mathematical Theory of Communication</u>, provide a precise definition of information as it will be used in this study. According to them, information is a measure of uncertainty, or entropy, in a situation. They hypothesized that, the greater the uncertainty, the the greater the lack of information. When a situation is completely predictable, no information is present. This is a condition known as negentropy. As used by the information theorist, the concept does not refer to a message, fact, or meaning. It is a concept bound only to the quantification of stimuli or signals in a situation.

Information, then can be viewed as the amount of uncertainty in the situation. Another concept considers information as the number of messages required to completely reduce the uncertainty in the situation. For example, Littlejohn (1989) provides us with the following analogy. Your friend is about to flip a coin. Will it land heads up or tails up? You are uncertain, you cannot predict. This uncertainty, which results from the entropy in the situation, will be eliminated by seeing the result of the flip. Now let us suppose you have received a tip that your friend's coin is two headed. The flip is "fixed." There is no uncertainty. The coin flip provides no information. In

other words, you could not receive any message that would make you predict any better than you already can. In short, a situation with which you are completely familiar has no information for you.

In applying the same rationale to this study, the following argument results: A soldier's level of job insecurity is significantly related to the soldier's level of information. Research has demonstrated the connection that a high level of job insecurity is related to a high degree of uncertainty, or lack of information. In strict compliance with information theory, it would require a great number of messages to completely reduce the uncertainty in this particular situation. In other words, a person would need more messages to predict the outcome of a complex situation, such as the one presented, then to predict the outcome of a simple one.

If soldiers fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt their military career, they fear for their job security. This high-level of job insecurity is caused by work force reductions developing under reduced organizational financial resources and the organization's inability to adapt to an environmental niche.

However, little is understood about the linkage between job insecurity and subjectively experienced job insecurity. This linkage involves perceptual processes that will be further explored from the perspective of communication theory as Thayer (1968) has done. Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt

(1984) argue that the perceptual processes are complicated by the effects of grieving on information processing that attend the loss of any important object. In this case, the important object lost is the basic need for safety and security.

The perceptual processes are also complicated by differential attention given to official organizational messages, evidence not deliberately communicated to organizational members, and rumors. And, finally Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt (1984) argue, the perceptual processes are complicated by individual differences in tolerance for security-threatening data.

The rationale is available in the literature to support such linkages as included in this conceptualization. Sound theoretical evidence will be provided throughout the course of this study to support all assumptions and conclusions as they are developed.

Figure 2 presents the conceptualization framework as described above and offers the reader a synopsis of the course taken in the present study.

<div align="center">Significance of the Problem</div>

What happens to an organization when its members experience high-levels of job insecurity? Anxiety could lead to problems with employee morale, attitude, performance, etc. If this were the case, would production levels and employee attendance rates suffer? What else

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STUDY

Exogenous Pressures

Bring about

Organizational Change 1 form Manifested as:
Organizational Decline; caused by:
1. Reduced Financial Resources
2. Inability to adapt to existing environment

C a n

L e a d   To

Retrenchment:
Work force reduction can result in a threat to one's job security

Anxiety Manifested as:
1. Reduced level of job insecurity
2. Higher levels of uncertainty

Information as a measurement of uncertainty

Information theory → Effects of: Job Security

IMPORTANCE TO ARMY:

MORALE
PERFORMANCE
ATTITUDE
UNCERTAINTY
ANXIETY
DEPRESSION
ABSENTEEISM
PRODUCTION LEVEL
RUMORS
TRUST
BELEIVEABLE LEADERS

Figure 2. Conceptualization of the Study. Pressure brings about change manifested as organizational decline. Decline can lead to retrenchment policies causing work force reductions further exacerbates the anxiety. Overall, anxiety will impact upon an individual's morale, performance, attitude, etc.

might suffer from a military standpoint? If the same scenario was applied to soldiers in the United States Army would the same rationale predict anxiety? Or does the character of a soldier "weather" some of the anxiety and displace the insecurity elsewhere?

In any event, issues which effect morale, attitude, and performance are of the utmost importance to all organizations, including the United States Army.

Military planners at all levels worry about soldier's attitude levels and their morale when undertaking operations. Army leaders assume in planning that a soldier's morale and attitude are at their peak and that his/her performance will always be 110 percent. It becomes the job of a soldier's leaders to keep these three "combat essentials" at their peak at all times. What happens when they are not? One really does not have to look too far back in history to discover examples of military operations undertaken under such circumstances.

In Vietnam, small units were plagued by mediocre performance by soldiers. In part, this performance was attributed to poor attitude and low levels of morale. Other causes ranged from drug use, a low perception of credible leaders, lack of support by the civilian population, and the perception of a double-standard applied to the officer corps and enlisted members, eliciting a "me" against "them" attitude.

As such, the Army is very concerned about its ability

to maintain a quality force during the drawdown; their best interests are at stake. Both Army officials and Congressional members assure the force that "people are their top priority," but do the soldiers believe such rhetoric?

This study is being undertaken to determine if soldiers are experiencing high levels of job insecurity due to the drawdown and to see whether soldiers believe their leaders when they say that "people are their top priority."

Review of Relevant Literature

There are at least four major organization theory approaches to understanding organizations. First, some theories espouse environmental determinism. One group, the population ecology perspective (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977) applies theories of biological evolution to organizations and argues that the environment selects entire groups of organizations for survival or extinction based on their organizational form.

The second approach, concerned more with organizational structuring, emphasizes managerial choice in adapting the organization's design to environmental demands or in seeking to alter these demands.

Open-system theories (Katz and Kahn, 1978) and structural contingency theories (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) emphasize the appropriateness of different clusters of organizational design characteristics in different

environmental conditions. The resource dependence
perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) is most applicable
to this research, for this perspective emphasizes that
organizations try to manage the uncertainty created by
dependence on the environment for resources.

The third set of organization theories emphasizes the
ways in which behavior in organizations is lawful in its
randomness, as in March and Olsen's (1976) view of
organizations as "organized anarchies."

The fourth set of theories -- phenomenological
approaches to organizations, most notably theories of
organizational culture (Frost et al., 1985) -- emphasizes the
process of social construction of shared meaning in
organizations.

Kaufman (1976) stated that government organizations
are neither immortal or unshrinkable. Like growth, he
argued, organizational decline and death, by erosion or
plan, is a form of organizational change; but all the
problems of managing organizational change are compounded by
a scarcity of "slack resources" (Cyert and March, 1963).

According to Levine (1978), this feature of declining
organizations -- the diminution of the cushion of spare
resources necessary for coping with uncertainty, risking
innovation, and rewarding loyalty and cooperation --
presents for government a problem that simultaneously
challenges the underlying premises and feasibility of both
contemporary management systems and the institutions of

pluralist liberal democracy.

Levine (1978) argues that little is known about the decline of public organizations and the management of cutbacks. This lack may be attributed to the fact some federal agencies (Works Progress Administration, Economic Recovery Administration, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Office of Economic Opportunity) and many state and local agencies have expanded and then contracted, or even died, while the public sector as a whole has expanded enormously over the last five decades. In this period of expansion and optimism among proponents of an active government, isolated incidents of zero growth and decline have been considered anomalous; and the difficulties faced by the management have been regarded as outside the mainstream of public management concerns. Kenneth Boulding (1975) labels this period the "Era of Slowdown." He postulates that we are now reappraising cases of public organizational decline and death as examples and forerunners in order to provide strategies for the design and management of mainstream public administration in a future dominated by resource scarcity (Boulding, 1975).

According to Levine (1978), the decline and death of government organizations is a symptom, a problem, and a contingency. Decline is a symptom of resource scarcity at a societal, even global, level that is creating the necessity for governments to terminate some programs, lower the activity of others, and confront tradeoffs between new

demands and old programs rather than to expand whenever a new public problem arises. Organizational decline is a problem for managers who must maintain organizational capacity by devising new managerial arrangements within prevailing structures that were designed under assumptions of growth. Organizational decline is a contingency for public employees and clients, employees who must sustain their morale and productivity in the face of increasing control from above and shrinking opportunities for creativity and promotion, while clients must find alternative sources for the services governments may no longer able to provide.

In the 1980s, several advanced definitions of organizational decline were developed. Greenhalgh (1983) proposed that decline was maladaptation to an environmental niche. Zammuto and Cameron (1985) proposed a similar definition for environmental niche. Cameron and his colleagues (1987) later distinguished between environmental and organizational decline, defining organizational decline as a reduction of resources within the organization. McKinley (1987) suggested a broad and integrative definition of decline as "a downturn in organizational size or performance that is attributable to change in the size or qualitative nature (shape) of an organization's environmental niche" (p. 89).

Definitions suggested (either explicitly or implicitly) in other writings include shrinking markets and increased

competition (Harrigan, 1982; Porter, 1980), budget cuts (Behn, 1983), lost funding sources (D'Aunno & Sutton, 1989), and work force reduction (Brockner, 1988; Cornfield, 1983; Krantz, 1985).

Nonetheless, despite several differences in opinion about which variables should be classified as the causes, the concept, and the consequences of decline, there appears to be considerable consensus about the fundamental changes that occur in declining organizations. Cameron and Whetten (1988) proposed that organizational decline was a two-step process, first characterized by deterioration of adaptation to the micro niche, and then followed by reduction of resources in the organization.

Their perspective follows the view that organizational effectiveness and survival depend on the continued participation of exchange partners, particularly external groups and individuals (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

Figure 1 (page 12) indicates that deterioration in environmental support typically leads to changes within declining organizations, specifically loss of financial resources and work force reduction. Considerable research attention has been devoted to the consequences that stem from this aspect of decline. Much of it is consistent with the model of organizational response to threat developed by Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981).

In their article entitled "Threat-Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior," they argue that many well-

publicized corporate collapses can be viewed as failures to alter response in the face of environmental change. They postulate that there may be a general tendency for individuals, groups, and organizations to behave rigidly in threatening situations and there may be two types of effects (Staw, Sandelands, and Sutton, 1981). First, a threat may result in restriction of information processing, such as a narrowing in the field of attention, a simplification in information codes, or a reduction in the number of channels used. Second, when a threat occurs, there may be a constriction in control, such that power and influence can become more concentrated or placed in higher levels of a hierarchy. Both effects seem relevant to this study, particularly, the restriction of information processing. Elements of information theory may offer insight into this phenomenon. Moreover, the authors hypothesize that a threat results in change in both the information and control processes of a system, and, because of these changes, a system's behavior is predicted to become less varied or flexible.

As outlined in Figure 3, the general thesis the authors explore in their article is that a threat to the vital interests of an entity, be it an individual, group, or organization, will lead to forms of rigidity. They further propose that threat-rigidity effects can be maladaptive. When the environment has changed radically, flexibility and diversity in response have survival value. Thus, they

Intensification of Threat
(under radical change)

Restriction in
Information

Environmental
Change

Threat (impending
loss or cost to the
entity)

Rigidity in Response
(tendency toward
well-learned or domi-
nant responses)

Constriction in
Control

Reduction of Threat
(under incremental change)

Figure 3. Threat-Rigidity Effects. A threat to the vital
interests of an entity, be it an individual group, or
organization, will lead to forms of rigidity. One form is
the restriction of information processing, such as a
narrowing in the field of attention, or a reduction in the
number of channels used.

argue, maladaptive cycles are predicted to follow from threats which encompass major environmental changes since prior, well-learned responses are inappropriate under new conditions. Can the same prediction be made for the United States Army?

Sutton (1990) points out that shrinking financial resources threaten organization members of all levels. However, Cameron and his colleagues (1987) suggest that members at lower hierarchical levels may, in fact, often be more threatened by budget cuts than managers because of the tendency for declining organizations to reduce direct workers more quickly than administrators (Freeman & Hannan, 1975). This study will attempt to determine if the same argument can be made between enlisted members and the officer corps in the United States Army.

Figure 4 summarizes a model of the effects of an objective decrease in organizational financial resources on organizations and jobs by Sutton (1990). He used the model of organizational response to threat developed by Staw et al. (1981) to guide the development of his framework. Their model was discussed previously.

The model in Figure 4 proposes that the threat evoked by an objective decrease in an organization's financial resources causes widespread anxiety among members and, in turn, leads to three categories of mechanistic rigidities in structures and jobs: restriction in information processing, constriction in control, and conservation of resources.

Sutton (1990) previously suggested that leaders and other members will feel threatened to the extent that their organization's financial resources are decreasing. The psychological literature reviewed by Staw and his colleagues (1981) indicates a strong link between threat and anxiety. Kahn (1981) documented the relationship between job stress and anxiety in his book <u>Work and Health</u>. The specific link between decreasing financial resources and anxiety is suggested by Gladstein and Reilly's (1985) research in which 24 groups of MBAs participated in variations of a management simulation called <u>The Tycoon Game</u>; a combination of time pressure and financial loss was associated with reports of greater strain.

In this vein, several qualitative studies suggest that organizational financial distress provokes anxiety, including Hirschhorn's (1983) work on retrenchment in public service agencies, Hirsch's (1987) tales of the distress provoked among middle managers by both successful and unsuccessful hostile takeover attempts, and Krantz's (1985) description of budget cutbacks in an antipoverty program. This link is also suggested in numerous journalistic accounts, including Osborne and Dvorak's (1984) story of the fall of Osborne Computers, and Marsh's (1985) account of the "agony" of International Harvester. As a result, following what Sutton (1990) refers to as "a modest but consistent literature." Figure 4 proposes that lost organizational financial resources causes anxiety among members, a key

Figure 4. Model of Effects of Reduced Financial Resources.
The threat evoked by an objective decrease in an
organization's financial resources causes widespread anxiety
among members and, in turn, leads to three categories of
mechanistic rigidities in structures and jobs: restriction
in information processing, constriction in control, and
conservation of resources.

point to remember as applied to this study.

Figure 4 proposes that the widespread anxiety evoked by reduced financial resources leads to three forms of rigidity: restriction in information processing, constriction of control, and conservation of resources. First, restriction in information processing may occur when anxiety causes leaders and other members to narrow their field of attention and lower their sensitivity to peripheral cues (Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Staw et al., 1981). In turn, they will have difficulty processing new or complex information.

Second, Figure 4 proposes that anxiety leads to constriction of control. Staw and his associates proposed that decision makers under threat try to enhance control so that subordinates will act in concert with their wishes. Anxiety hampers the ability to process equivocal information, thus leaders may centralize authority because it eliminates uncertainty about which decisions will be made and implemented.

Third, as Figure 4 proposes, conservation of resources may occur in response to the anxiety provoked by loss of financial resources. Conservation of resources indicates rigidity when leaders become preoccupied with efficiency, reduce resources for new activities, and pay less attention to the organization's environment.

The organizing framework summarized in Figure 1 (page 12) proposes that loss of internal financial resources can

lead to work force reduction. According to Kimberly (1976), an organization's financial resources and its work force are conceptually distinct aspects of size. The level of an organization's financial resources and the size of its work force are highly correlated in some samples (e.g., McKinley, 1987), especially in organizations that are labor intensive and that have few slack financial resources. But levels of financial resources and work force size are not strongly related in other samples. Organizations that depend heavily on "knowledge workers" who are expensive to replace or that have employees with valuable organization-specific skills may respond to decreased revenues by using cash reserves, borrowing money, or instituting pay cuts rather than reducing their valuable work forces (Greenhalgh, Lawrence, & Sutton, 1988).

In organizations where changes in internal financial resources are not strongly linked to changes in number of personnel, decreases in each of these aspects of size will lead to distinct changes in structures and jobs. Sutton (1990) portrays a model of the effects of decreases in work force size in Figure 5. In it, Sutton (1990) integrates the psychological threat-rigidity model described earlier (Staw et al., 1981) and the sociological administrative theory (Blau, 1970; Child, 1973).

The model proposes that an objective decrease in work force size evokes: (1) increased anxiety among surviving organizational members, and (2) decreased need for

coordination and control of the smaller work force. Sutton (1990) proposes that, in the short-term, the anxiety will be sufficiently distracting for leaders and other members that the decreased need for coordination and control will not be noticed; as a result, work force reduction will initially cause structures and jobs to become more mechanistic. Eventually, however, the anxiety will wane. But the decreased need for coordination and control of the smaller work force will persist. Thus, Sutton (1990) argues, in the long term, organizational structures will change so that less mechanistic structures and jobs will be evident. Remember that work force reduction appears to provoke anxiety in both leaders and other members who remain after such organizational shrinkage is implemented. But as Whetten (1980) notes, the American culture emphasizes that growth equals progress. If growth is a sign of success, then shrinkage will be seen as a sign of ineffectiveness and poor leadership. As a result, leaders who implement work force reduction may construe that their job security is threatened.

The speed at which the process described above unfolds may vary widely across organizations. Figure 5 depicts three moderator variables that are proposed to play key roles in amplifying or dampening the strength of short-term effects of work force reduction, strength of short-term effects of work force reduction, and in hastening or stalling the transition from short-term to long-term

effects.

First, the severity of work force reduction strategy. Severe work force reduction strategies are more threatening and thus may provoke more pronounced and longer lasting mechanistic shifts in structures and jobs. The extent to which work force reduction is construed as threatening depends heavily on the means through which it is accomplished. Greenhalgh and his colleagues (1988) proposed a hierarchy of five categories of work force reduction strategies: (1) natural attrition (e.g., hiring freeze); (2) induced redeployment (e.g., voluntary transfer); (3) involuntary redeployment (e.g., involuntary transfer); (4) layoff with outplacement assistance; and (5) layoff without outplacement assistance. They proposed that layoff without outplacement assistance is most severe for employees because it provides them the least control over the continuity of employment, while natural attrition is least severe because it affords employees the greatest control. In contrast, from the organization's perspective, natural attrition affords the least short-term cost savings, while layoffs without outplacement provide the greatest short-term savings.

The strategy the Army has chosen to comply with the 25 percent reduction in force figure (by 1995) is one which is even more severe than those considered above: involuntary separations through some undefined screening process. The term "layoff" implies that one can always be "rehired" at

Figure 5. Effects of Decreases in Work Force Size. An objective decrease in work force size evokes: (1) increased anxiety among surviving organizational members and (2) decreased need for coordination and control of the smaller work force. Of interest to this study is the former finding of increased anxiety among survivors. Moderator variables play a key role in the strength of the effects of work force reduction.

some point in time. An involuntary separation is just like it sounds, or: "You're fired!"

Building on the previous hierarchy, Sutton (1990) argues that survivors will feel most threatened when layoffs, especially layoffs without outplacement support, are used, and least threatened by strategies short of layoff. He goes on to say that the survivors who may feel least threatened by layoffs are top managers who, by saving organizational funds, may be increasing their own job security. Certainly the same logic may have implications for senior Army officers versus lower enlisted members. Sutton (1990) also points out that top managers have the nasty job of facing those whom they dismiss, along with the (often anxious and angry) surviving co-workers.

Second, independent of the severity of the work force reduction strategy selected, the way in which it is implemented can influence the amount of anxiety provoked. Work on layoffs by Brockner and his colleagues (Brockner, 1988; Brockner, Grover, Reed, Dewitt, & O'Malley, 1987) and by Greenhalgh and colleagues (Greenhalgh, 1982; 1983; Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984) suggests that the threat posed by layoffs, or other work force reduction strategies, will be exacerbated to the extent that they are construed as: (1) unfair; (2) unpredictable; and (3) uncontrollable.

The authors argue that survivors may construe that work force reduction is implemented unfairly because the decision rules used to select those who are laid off, transferred, or

demoted are inappropriate. For example, although managers
often prefer to lay off employees on the basis of merit
rather than seniority, workers may perceive that the system
of performance evolution is arbitrary and unfair. Surviving
employees may also become upset when they construe that
those who lost jobs were not compensated fairly; Brockner
and his colleagues (1987) present evidence from field and
laboratory studies suggesting that survivors are likely to
react negatively (i.e., have lower work performance and
organizational commitment) when they construe that laid off
similar employees have not been compensated fairly.

Work force reduction that is implemented in ways that
are unpredictable in timing, magnitude and duration may
accentuate survivor anxiety. Following Seligman's (1975)
signal/safety hypothesis, work force reduction is especially
threatening when employees cannot anticipate when it will
occur, how widely the effects will be spread, and how many
rounds of reduction will occur. Top management often tries
to keep secret their plans for work force reduction. But
rumors of work force reduction may abound because the
organization is experiencing financial difficulties, or
because employees have unofficial information that secret
meetings have occurred. These rumors can fuel employee's
fears of job insecurity because they cannot predict what the
changes will be.

The threat of such uncertainty is greatest when top
management engages in long periods of secrecy that are

punctuated at unpredictable intervals with announcements of
work force reduction. Employees who remain after a round of
reductions in such organizations have little reason to
believe that they will survive the next round of reductions,
and have no way of knowing when the next round will be
announced. This historical pattern can create a constant
state of anxiety and depression throughout the work force
because, in Seligman's (1975) terms, there is no trustworthy
signal that indicates when they are safe from threats such
as job loss, demotions, and involuntary transfers. In this
vein, Greenhalgh (1983) asserts that a job insecurity crisis
may be provoked when surviving employees -- who have
witnessed numerous rounds of unexpected layoffs or demotions
-- become paralyzed by the stress of uncertainty.

In sum, Sutton (1990) argues, strategies that are
implemented in ways that are unfair, unpredictable, and
uncontrollable can lead to greater and more enduring anxiety
throughout the organization, which can hamper the transition
form short-term to long-term effects of work force
reduction. Is the Army considering such strategies?

The generic concept of security, long a prominent
concern of organizational behaviorists and psychologists, is
a vital concept in this research. Theorists have focused on
security either as part of a personality theory (Blatz,
1966; Sullivan, 1964), as a motivation theory (Maslow,
1954), or as a part of a press/need duality (Murray, 1938).

Three lines of inquiry have emerged that have been

particularly influential in shaping theory and research relevant to security in organizations. The works of Maslow, Herzberg, and Super are most influential here. As stated previously, Maslow's need hierarchy was not conceived as a theory of behavior in an organizational context, but Maslow himself suggested its applicability to organizational settings: "We can perceive the expressions of safety needs in such phenomena as . . . the common preference for a job with tenure and protection" (1954, p. 87).

Another body of literature, reflecting a different approach, involves Herzberg's two-factor theory (Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959). In contrast to Maslow's view of security as a motivator, Herzberg considers security an extrinsic hygiene factor (along with such job properties as salary and working conditions). Herzberg also incorporates the dual need-experience dimensions, referring to job security as both a first level factor (an objective aspect of the situation that can be experienced) and a second level factor (the meaning of events for the individual, with meaning partly determined by needs). He defines job security to include these features of the job situation which lead to assurance for continued employment, either within the same company or within the same type of work or profession. This definition focuses on continuity of employment as the main core of job security. Herzberg's content analysis of interview data showed that job security was the most important extrinsic factor, but his approach

has since been discredited (House & Wigdor, 1967; Vroom, 1964).

Super viewed security as " . . . one of the dominant needs and one of the principle reasons for working" (1957, p. 13). He incorporated the construct into his occupational development theory. He observed that the subjective meaning attributed to security varies but the main components of job security are always the same, namely, seniority and a stable company.

Blum (1975) continued this line of inquiry, identifying job security as a major factor in occupational choice. He constructed a security scale based on 19 theoretically derived subdomains of job security such as preference for physical safety, dependence on rules, and adequate job training. This scale was validated against two subscales of the Edwards (1957) personal preference schedule: desire for order and avoidance of change. Blum's (1975) subsequent findings support Super's theory in that they demonstrate the relationship between security tendencies and organizational orientations.

Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984) present a model of the nature, causes and consequences of job insecurity as presented. Their model (Figure 6) represents their attempt to reconcile and integrate the diversity they experienced in the existing literature. It focuses on job insecurity as an environmental press -- an experienced characteristic of the individuals' work environment. The need for security is

explicitly included as an individual dimension moderating individuals perceptions of threat and their reactions to it.

What the individual perceives as potential loss of continuity in a job situation can span the range from permanent loss of the job itself to loss of some subjectively important feature of the job. Job insecurity, according to Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt (1984), occurs only in the case of involuntary loss.

Figure 6 shows that subjective threat is derived from objective threat by means of the individual's perceptual processes, which transform environmental data into information used in thought processes (Thayer, 1967). Employees have three basic sources of data, each of which requires interpretation. The first source is official organizational announcements. These typically are minimal during times of change (Jick & Greenhalgh, 1981) and tend to be viewed by employees as rhetorical rather than factual. They are designed to shape employees' perceptions in a way that saves organizational interests. The second source -- unintended organizational clues evident to employees -- includes data that are not mediated by power elites. Rumors are the third data source. They abound during times of threat, especially when official messages are scarce.

The authors argue in their model that the subjective threat involved in job insecurity is multifaceted. They believe that facets can be grouped in two basic dimensions: the security of the threat to one's job and powerlessness to

counter the threat.

The security of the threat to continuity in a work situation depends on the scope and importance of the potential loss and the subjective probability of the loss occurring, according to Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt (1984). Important distinctions to jobholders include: (1) whether the anticipated loss is temporary or permanent; (2) whether the action causing the loss is layoff or firing; and (3) whether the change represents loss of the job itself or loss of job features.

According to Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984), the subjective probability of the loss occurring depends on the nature and number of sources of threats to continuity. The principle sources of threat are identified in Table 1. The most important source of threat is organizational decline. The authors state that employees usually know when an organization is in decline, that is, when it has become maladapted to its niche (Greenhalgh, 1983). They also know that maladaptation often leads to organizational shrinkage and other adjustments that are likely to affect the continuity of their current job situations.

The sense of powerlessness is an important element of job insecurity because it exacerbates the experienced threat, according to Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984). They state that powerlessness can take four basic forms, as noted in Table 1. The first form is lack of protection: Unions, seniority systems, and employment contracts are forms of

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
—Locus of Control
—Conservatism
—Work Orientation
—Attribution Tendencies
—Need for Security

INTENDED
ORGANIZATIONAL
MESSAGES

OBJECTIVE
THREAT TO
INDIVIDUAL

UNINTENDED
ORGANIZATIONAL
CLUES

SUBJECTIVE THREAT
—Severity of Threat
—Powerlessness

REACTIONS TO
JOB INSECURITY
—Effort↓
—Propensity to
leave↑
—Resistance to
change↑

SOCIAL
SUPPORT

RUMORS

DEPENDENCE

OCCUPATIONAL
MOBILITY

ECONOMIC
INSECURITY

REDUCED
ORGANIZATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS
—Productivity↓
—Turnover↑
—Adaptability↓

Figure 6. Summary of Consequences of Job Insecurity.
Reconciliation and integration of existing literature
focusing on job insecurity as an experienced characteristic
of the individual's work environment.

protection serving to boost the individual's power to resist threats to continuity.

The second factor contributing to a sense of powerlessness is unclear expectancies (Porter & Lawler, 1968). For example, the employee may perceive a threat to continuity but may not know what achieved performance is necessary to maintain status in a job.

The culture of an organization also is likely to influence the employee's sense of powerlessness to maintain desired continuity. An authoritarian culture, such as the Army for example, would provide little comfort.

The fourth factor affecting powerlessness is the employee's beliefs about the organization's standard operating procedures for dismissing employees. In the case of firing, the authors argue, the absence of policies such as progressive discipline and automatic review of a decision to fire makes the employee feel very much at the mercy of the superior. In the case of work force reductions, many organizations resort to layoff as a standard operating procedure without seriously considering such alternatives as attrition, early retirement, and work sharing (Greenhalgh & McKersie, 1980; Schultz & Weber, 1966).

Another element must be introduced to provide the linkage between organizational and communication theory, the concept of uncertainty. Uncertainty is the term used to express how confident or sure you are about something. Uncertainty refers to the lack of predictability or

Table 1. Dimensions of Job Insecurity. Summary of dimensions of job insecurity and their inclusion in reported studies. The sense of powerlessness is an important element of job insecurity because it exacerbates the experienced threat of the loss of one's job.

Severity of threat	Nature of loss	Lose present job	Indefinite job loss Temporary job loss Demotion to another job within organization
		Keep present job but lose job features	Career progress Income stream Status/self-esteem Autonomy Resources Community
		Sources of threat	Decline/shrinkage Reorganization Technological change Physical danger
Powerlessness			Lack of protection Unclear expectancies Authoritarian environment Dismissal SOPs[b]

[a]See also Miskel & Heller (1973).
[b]Standard Operating Procedures.

structure of some set of events, such as the presence of one or more patterns: the less predictable, the less structured, the more uncertainty is present. Randomness is another way of expressing uncertainty: if the presence of patterns is random, if there is little that is definite about what patterns there are, then we have uncertainty. In summary, the more uncertainty in a situation, the less knowledge we have about it, the less we can say about it, "for sure."

According to Thayer (1961), the exchange of information is the first need of all organized behavior. He argues that without information feeding into, through, and out of an organization, it would quickly collapse. The communication of information, then, is essential to the existence of any organization.

In the strict statistical sense of information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), there is a direct relationship between uncertainty and information. Information theory gives a measure of the uncertainty in any situation on the basis of two factors: (1) the number of alternative patterns identified in the situation, and (2) the probabilities of occurrence of each alternative. The greater the number of alternative patterns, the greater the uncertainty, since it is harder to predict exactly which pattern will appear in any given instance. The more the patterns are equally likely to occur, the greater the uncertainty; uncertainty is greater when there is an equal

chance of patterns appearing than when one pattern is more likely than others to appear.

One could ask then how do information and uncertainty relate? The more uncertainty present in a given situation, then the more "information value" a pattern has when it appears. Given all the possible outcomes in a particular situation, when you learn which specific pattern occurs, your uncertainty is reduced; you have gained information. Thus, the more predictable a situation, the more information we have about it -- and the lower its uncertainty. Conversely, the less structured a situation, the higher its uncertainty -- so when a particular pattern does appear, uncertainty decreases and hence more information is obtained. Information can be viewed, then, as the use of patterns to reduce uncertainty.

The last body of literature reviewed for relevance is that of communicator credibility.

Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) point out that the effectiveness of a communication is commonly assumed to depend to a considerable extent upon who delivers it. For example, if the communicator is a striking personality and an effective speaker who holds the attention of an audience, he or she can increase the likelihood of attentive consideration of the new opinion. Furthermore, if the author is personally admired or a member of a high status group, his or her words may raise the incentive value of the advocated opinion by suggesting that approval, from himself

or from the group, will follow its adaptation. The authors state that when acceptance is sought by using arguments in support of the advocated view, the perceived expertness and trustworthiness of the communicator may determine the credence given them.

Certainly, high-ranking Department of Defense officials would qualify for all three of the prerequisites mentioned above. Generally speaking, these officials are effective speakers, members of high status groups, and perceived to be experts in their field, worthy of trust and confidence.

So are they credible communicators? Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) assume these various effects of the communicator are mediated by attitudes toward him or her which are held by members of the audience. They argue that any of a number of different attitudes may underlie the influence exerted by a given communicator. Some may have to do with feelings of affection and admiration and stem in part from desires to be like him or her. Others may involve awe and fear of the communicator, based on perceptions of his power to reward or punish according to one's adherence to his or her recommendations or demands. Still other important attitudes are those of trust and confidence; two important ingredients considered by many in the Army as essential for effective communication.

More important to this research, an individual may believe that a communicator is capable of transmitting valid statements, but still be inclined to reject the

communication if he or she suspects the communicator is motivated to make nonvalid assertions, a hunch felt by many to be the case with assertions made by Pentagon planners regarding the force drawdown.

Suggestive evidence on the importance of the communicator's being considered sincere rather than "just another salesman" is provided by Merton's (1946) analysis of Kate Smith's war bond selling campaign during which she broadcast continuously for eighteen hours. Merton (1946) believes that one of the main reasons for her phenomenal success was the high degree of sincerity attributed to her by the audience.

According to Arislotle, the character, ethos, or ethical persuasion of the speaker is a cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make the speaker worthy of belief. Accordingly, Arislotle argued, this trust should be created by the speech itself, and not left to depend upon an antecedent impression that the speaker is this or that kind of man. According to Arislotle, it is therefore not true that the probity of the speaker contributes nothing to his or her persuasiveness; on the contrary, a speaker's character (ethos--ethical persuasiveness) is the most potent of all the means of persuasion.

In the end, persuasion will be the primary means of delivery by Department of Defense officials regarding pending reductions-in-force as outlined in the Pentagon's five-year plan to comply with mandated personnel cuts. It

will be the job of leaders to credibly outline the procedures for such cutbacks to the very personnel affected by such cuts.

Certainly, the concepts just discussed will be considered by Defense officials as they attempt to explain the future of all United States armed forces. Credibility of source is an important concept. This study will examine source credibility of senior Defense Department officials.

Rationale, Assumptions, and Questions

The purpose of this study is to determine the levels of job insecurity among soldiers in the United States Army resulting from the 25 percent reduction in force structure imposed by Congress and announced by the Army. This study is additionally being undertaken to determine the perceived credibility of senior Department of Defense officials as sources of information regarding the force drawdown. The study will assume the following:

A1 The United States Army is an organization undergoing large scale organizational change as defined by Mohrman et al. (1989) under the section: operational definition of terms.

A2 A person's level of job insecurity is positively correlated to a person's perceived level of uncertainty about his/her ability to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job situation.

The study will seek to answer the following questions:

Q1 What is the level of job insecurity being experienced by soldiers in the United States Army following the projected force drawdown?

Q2 Are enlisted soldiers experiencing greater levels of job insecurity than commissioned officers?

Q3 Is there an inverse relationship between a soldier's level of job insecurity and the level of credibility of senior defense leaders? (Will high job insecurity levels yield low credibility values?)

Definition of Terms

1. Large scale organizational change: a lasting change in the character of an organization that significantly alters its performance (Mohrman et al., 1989). Accordingly, this definition comprises two important constructs: change in character and change in performance.

2. Organizational decline: a two-step process, first characterized by deterioration of adaptation to the microniche, and then followed by a reduction of resources in the organization (Cameron et al., 1988).

3. Job Insecurity: perceived powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job situation (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984). The two basic dimensions of job insecurity are related multiplicatively, as follows:

felt job insecurity = perceived severity of threat

X perceived powerlessness to resist threats.

The relationship is multiplicative in the sense that if either of the two factors is insignificant, the degree of experienced job insecurity also is insignificant (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984).

4. <u>Drawdown</u>: Army jargon for the projected 25 percent reduction in force levels to be accomplished between 1991 and 1995.

5. <u>Information</u>: defined as a measurement of uncertainty, or entropy, in a particular situation (Shannon and Waver, 1949).

6. <u>Work force reductions</u>: defined as the elimination of personnel in an organization via involuntary separations, i.e. firings.

<div align="center">Conclusion</div>

In conclusion, the literature reviewed in support of this study provides foundational evidence of the conceptual linkages between job insecurity, anxiety and communicator credibility. Key to the communication student is the latter, which may prove to be the critical aspect of this study.

Source credibility is an area of study in communication which has received generous attention. This study will seek to determine among other things, the relationship between source credibility and perceived job insecurity among soldiers in the United States Army.

Chapter 2

METHODOLOGY

A secondary statistical analysis of existing data
derived from a survey developed by the editors of the <u>Army</u>
<u>Times</u> newspaper will be undertaken to determine the levels
of job insecurity among soldiers in the United States Army.
This survey represents the views of soldiers before the
deployment of U.S. forces to the Middle East in support of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. As such, one can only
speculate whether the same survey run today would yield
similar results from respondents. Regardless, this study is
designed to capture the level of job security present among
soldiers as of the date of the survey.

The <u>Army Times</u> is an independent newspaper serving Army
people for the past 51 years. It is not affiliated with the
United States Army in any manner and prides itself on its
ability to provide objective and accurate news to the
soldier.

Sample

A non-probability sample will be utilized in this study
due to the nature of the respondents of the survey

questionnaire. On July 16, 1990, the Army Times ran a reader survey to determine how its readers felt about the sweeping changes facing the military following the end to the Cold War and the inherent reduced Soviet threat.

Over 5,000 readers responded to the survey in the Army Times, Air Force Times, and Navy Times. More than 1,500 Army personnel responded to the survey in the Army Times alone.

Inherent in this readership survey is the inability to provide for a random sample because: (1) respondents had to read the survey in the Army Times newspaper, which indicates that the respondent was either: (a) a subscriber to the newspaper, creating a possible bias or, (b) the respondent purchased a copy of the Army Times from a newsstand, creating the same potential for bias as (a) above, or, the respondent accessed a copy of the Army Times from some other source, for example: a friend's copy, unit copy, etc . . . (2) respondents may only be those individuals who are prone to voicing their opinions in surveys such as this one, eliminating potential random sampling among respondents.

The Army Times has a weekly circulation strength of 160,000. The current Army end strength figure is about 750,000 men and women. A quick calculation reveals a twenty-one percent subscription rate by Army personnel. Also this figure does not include secondary readers of the Army Times. Speaking as a concerned soldier myself, I rely on the Army Times as the primary source of information

regarding my career. The newspaper is clearly the most comprehensive and timely source of accurate material available to the soldier today. Accessibility to the newspaper is generally easy for all soldiers, for most units purchase a subscription for their soldiers to read. Commanders recognize this source of information as important to the soldiers because it contains information not available through regular command publications. The newspaper is published weekly and is available throughout the world.

Research Design

Secondary analysis benefits science in many ways, all stemming from one fundamental feature of the method (Hymen, 1972). It expands the types and numbers of observations to cover more adequately a wider array of social conditions, measurement procedures and variables that can usually be studied by primary surveys (Hymen, 1972).

As a result, it (secondary analysis) produces a more comprehensive and definitive emperical study of the problems the investigator has formulated (Hymen, 1972).

Quite practically, it is self-evident that solving a problem by the analysis of existing survey data, rather than collecting data in a new survey, economizes on money, time, and personnel.

In the particular case of this study, a secondary analysis of existing data provided the researcher with an extremely large sample; n= 1, 923.

The availablity of such a statisically large sample proved to be the primary reason a secondary analysis was undertaken. The benefits of such a sample presented a trade-off for the author: developing an original measurement scale versus the use of an extremely large sample through existing data.

A survey questionnaire (see Appendix A) was designed to determine how soldiers felt about the changes sweeping through the military. The questions themselves were designed to elicit ordinal to interval levels of measurement.

Of particular interest to this research are questions six, seven, nine, ten, eleven, thirteen, and, fourteen. All other questions in Appendix A are not directly associated with the particular research goals of this study.

Statistical Analysis

Upon close scrutiny of the existing data, it appears interval levels of measurement are indeed available for statistical analysis. Assumptions regarding interval data in scale construction have been met and afford the researcher with the best possible data within the limitations of this study. The use of an interval scale, coupled with a desire to determine degrees of correlation between variables, dictates the use of certain parametric statistics.

Questions one (1) through question three (3) were analyzed using the Pearson product moment coefficient or

Pearson's r. This statistic measures the degree and direction of the relationship between variables. Specifically, the variables were tested in the following manner:

Q1 = {Pearson's r = Q6 : Q7}

Q2 = {Pearson's r = Q6 : Grade (enlisted/officer)}

     {Mean difference between officers and enlisted}

Q3 = {Pearson's r = Q6 : Q11; Q6 : Q13; Q6 : Q14}

Question two (2) used the t-test and Pearson's r to establish any differences between levels of job insecurity among enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers.

Chi-square calculations were computed using only Army active and reserve respondents, reducing the total sample to 1,421. This decision to use only these categories was reached after consulting with the news editor for the Army Times. He believed that retirees answered some questions as if they were somehow still in the military, thereby possibly skewing the results of the survey questionnaire.

Pearson's r calculations were performed using only active Army and reserve respondents also. The t-test was calculated using active Army and reserve respondents as well.

A confidence level of significance was established at 0.05 for all analyses of data.

Chapter 3

RESULTS

The results of the statistical analysis of the data are presented.

Overview of the Data

Fifteen variables were contained within the 1990 _Army Times_ reader survey questionnaire (Appendix A). Out of this 15, seven survey questions were applicable to the goals of this study.

The seven questions themselves were grouped among two broad clusters of questions: (a) job insecurity and, (b) credibility. Within the job insecurity cluster, four survey questions were directly relevant to this research:

Six, a key item in the evaluation of the variable, was the linchpin behind the job insecurity cluster of questions to be analyzed and asked:

"I fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt my military career."

Seven, another primary variable in the job insecurity cluster, asked:

"I fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt the military careers of other capable military service

members."

Two lesser survey questions, 9 and 10, were analyzed regarding job insecurity and serve as supplemental analysis only. Nine asked:

"The talk of large manpower cuts as the defense budget shrinks has made me less likely to want to stay in the service past the end of my current commitment."

Ten asked:

"Talented service members who work hard will still be able to have rewarding military careers, even if the military gets smaller."

Within the "credibility" cluster of variables, three survey questions were directly relevant to this research: Eleven, a key item in the evaluation of the variable "credibility," asked:

"I believe defense leaders when they say that protecting "people programs" will be their top priority as the defense budget shrinks."

This question is designed to measure the trust and confidence levels of respondents regarding the ability of defense leaders as reliable sources of information.

Thirteen, although not a key item in the evaluation of the variable "credibility," is an important question. Particularly relevant to the communication student, this question strikes at the core of information theory and the ability of an organization to disseminate timely information to subordinates in a complex and uncertain situation:

"Defense leaders are doing a good job of letting

service members in the field know what their plans for

handling the drawdown are."

This question is designed to determine if respondents feel they are receiving adequate information from defense leaders regarding long-range military plans.

The importance of information is not to be overlooked for information serves as the catalyst for uncertainty reduction in complex situations (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Thirteen supplements the credibility cluster of variables.

Fourteen, another key item for evaluation in the credibility cluster asked:

"If service members are forced to leave the military by

the drawdown, they will be treated fairly."

Job insecurity is defined as "perceived powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job situation" (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984).

Credibility is defined by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) as "the perceived expertness and trustworthiness of the communication." Credibility then, is an attitude toward a source of communication held at a given time by a receiver.

The Army Times reader survey was scored on a four-point scale. Respondents used the actual questionnaire contained in the Army Times newspaper as reply sheets. When computing the results, strongly agreeing with the statement was scored as one and strongly disagreeing with the statement was

scored as four.

Research Questions

The first question of this project sought to determine if individuals were experiencing anxiety and job insecurity as a result of the drawdown.

Over 75 percent (77.3 percent) of active Army personnel and Army reservists who responded to the survey agree that cuts to the defense budget will hurt their military careers (see Tables 2,3) while 92.7 percent believe that cuts to the defense budget will hurt the military careers of other capable service members. In this respect, those who responded to the survey seem optimistic that they could survive personnel reductions.

The chi-square test for responses to "I fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt my military career" reveals statistically significant results. The chi-square (chi-square= 472.839, df = 3, p > .000) measurement reveals a very concerned Army regarding the future of their own military careers (see Table 4).

Chi-square (chi-square= 1492.594, df = 3, p > .000) calculations for question seven reveal a majority of respondents agree that cuts to defense budget will hurt the military careers of other capable service members too.

The mean for question six is 1.91, with a standard deviation of .977. The average answer for question six falls somewhere between "strongly agree" to "somewhat agree" in response to the statement "I fear cuts to the defense

budget will hurt my military career" (see Table 5).

The mean for question seven is 1.49 and the standard deviation is .743. This translates to even stronger agreement with the phrase "I fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt the military careers of other capable military service members" (see Table 5).

This result is consistent with previously reported findings which indicated respondents were generally more optimistic about their own futures than the futures of others.

Regarding question one, the results indicate a very high level of job insecurity experienced by soldiers in the United States Army; nearly eight of ten respondents fearing for their own job security and nine of ten fearing for the job security of other military members. The positive correlation (r= .6002) between questions six and seven (n= 1,418, df= 9, p > .000) is statistically significant as well. This highly positive correlation confirms a strong relationship between the views of respondents in question six and the views of respondents in question seven of the original survey (see Table 7).

Essentially, integrating the mean, chi-square and correlations leads to the conclusion that cuts to the defense budget are perceived as adversely affecting not only the individual soldier, but his or her colleagues as well.

Responses to question nine and question ten of the original survey generate mixed results. Only 44.7 percent

of active Army personnel and Army reservists agreed that the talk of large manpower cuts has made them less likely to want to stay in the service beyond their current commitment.

Similarly, 51.5 percent of active Army personnel and Army reservists agree that talented service members who work hard will still be able to have rewarding military careers in light of a smaller military (see Tables 8 and 9).

The result is that, while a majority of soldiers want to remain in the service, little more than half the respondents believe rewarding military careers await those who do.

In summary, by integrating reactions to three questions of the job insecurity cluster of data, it appears soldiers are experiencing high levels of job insecurity over the projected force drawdown. Interestingly, respondents seem to think their own position and status in the Army is more secure than the position and status of their peers.

The results show that the insecurity is not confined to any certain category of respondents. Rather, the anxiety and insecurity manifested as a result of the pending cutbacks covers the domain of the sample.

However, one pattern of responses has emerged revealing differences between enlisted personnel and officers.

Question two of this study attempts to determine if enlisted soldiers are experiencing greater levels of job insecurity than commissioned officers.

Table 2

Values of Job Insecurity Variable (self) - Q6

Q6	STATUS ROW % COL % TOT %	Active 1	Reserve 2	Retired 3	Other 4
Strongly Agree	1	555 78.6 46.7 33.7	70 9.9 30.3 4.3	71 10.1 34.3 4.3	10 1.4 50.0 .6
Somewhat Agree	2	376 71.2 31.6 22.8	96 18.2 41.6 5.8	52 9.8 25.1 3.2	4 .8 20.0 .2
Somewhat Disagree	3	166 64.3 14.0 10.1	52 20.2 22.5 3.2	37 14.3 17.9 2.2	3 1.2 15.0 .2
Strongly Disagree	4	92 59.4 7.7 5.6	13 8.4 5.6 .8	47 30.3 22.7 2.9	3 1.2 15.0 .2
Column total		1189 72.2	231 14.1	207 12.6	20 1.2

Table 3

Values of Job Insecurity Variable (others) - Q7

Q7	STATUS ROW % COL % TOT %	Active 1	Reserve 2	Retired 3	Other 4
Strongly Agree	1	814 68.2 68.5 42.8	131 11.0 54.8 6.9	229 19.2 51.8 12.0	19 1.6 59.4 1.0
Somewhat Agree	2	292 54.9 24.6 15.4	87 16.4 36.4 4.6	144 27.1 32.6 7.6	9 1.7 28.1 .5
Somewhat Disagree	3	48 39.3 4.0 2.5	21 17.2 8.8 1.1	49 40.2 11.1 2.6	4 3.3 12.5 .2
Strongly Disagree	4	35 63.6 2.9 1.8		20 36.4 4.5 1.1	
Column total		1189 62.5	239 12.6	442 23.2	32 1.7

Table 4

Chi-square Values for Survey Variables

(active Army and reserve respondents only)

	Chi-square	D.F.	n	Sig.
Q6	472.839	3	1,420	.000
Q7	1492,594	3	1,428	.000
Q9	59.213	3	1,392	.000
Q10	89.642	3	1,429	.000
Q11	454.000	3	1,426	.000
Q13	337.758	3	1,417	.000
Q14	449.701	3	1,416	.000

n= 1,421

Table 5

Mean Values for Original Survey Variables

VARIABLE (STATUS)	Mean	(sd)	(n)
CATEGORY: JOB INSECURITY			
Q6	1.9162	.9774	1647
Q7	1.4947	.7430	1902
Q9	2.6452	1.1584	1536
Q10	2.3667	1.0190	1909
CATEGORY: CREDIBILITY			
Q11	3.0341	.8838	1907
Q13	2.9546	.9158	1872
Q14	3.0258	.8465	1896

n= 1,923

Table 6

Mean Values for Original Survey Variables

VARIABLE (GRADE)	Mean	(sd)	(n)
CATEGORY: JOB INSECURITY			
Q6	1.9124	.9756	1632
Q7	1.4955	.7466	1875
Q9	2.6465	1.1552	1522
Q10	2.3677	1.0201	1882
CATEGORY: CREDIBILITY			
Q11	3.0399	.8839	1880
Q13	2.9561	.9155	1845
Q14	3.0289	.8465	1869

Table 7

Correlation Between Major Variables

	Q6	Q7	Q11	Q13	Q14
Q6					
Q7	.6002 (1418) p=.005				
Q11	-.1393 (1416) p=.005	-.1016 (1424) p=.005			
Q13	-.1422 (1407) p=.005	-.1257 (1415) p=.005	.4167 (1415) p=.005		
Q14	-.2666 (1407) p=.005	-.2483 (1414) p=.005	.4487 (1414) p=.005	.4447 (1407) p=.005	

n= 1,421

Overall, the results indicate strong concern and fear that cuts to the defense budget will hurt the careers of all service members. However, the survey reveals statistical significance is present between enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers' responses.

Over 80 percent of enlisted soldiers (active Army and reserve respondents only) who responded to the survey fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt their military career.

Almost 75 percent of commissioned officers (active Army and reserve respondents only) fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt their military careers as well (see Table 10).

Previous research confirms that members at lower hierarchical levels may, in fact, often be more threatened by work force reductions than managers because of the tendency for declining organizations to reduce direct workers more quickly than administrators (Freeman & Hannan, 1975; Cameron, Kim, and Whetten, 1987). These findings are supported by the results of this study. Table eleven reveals a difference in mean values and standard deviation. The t-test indicates the difference to be significant. Apparently, soldiers in the field have the perception that enlisted soldiers seem more expendable and easier to eliminate than officers. Perceptions are that the Army has too great an investment in its officer corps. Decision makers appear reluctant to trim officers to meet mandated Congressional cuts.

Table 8

Values of Job Insecurity Variables - Q9

Q9	STATUS ROW % COL % TOT %	Active 1	Reserve 2	Retired 3	Other 4
Strongly Agree	1	275 79.0 23.5 17.9	24 6.9 10.7 1.6	41 11.8 32.3 2.7	8 2.3 47.1 .5
Somewhat Agree	2	291 82.0 24.9 18.9	33 9.3 14.7 2.1	28 7.9 22.0 1.8	3 .8 17.6 .2
Somewhat Disagree	3	242 74.0 20.7 15.8	56 17.1 25.0 3.6	25 7.6 19.7 1.6	4 1.2 23.5 .3
Strongly Disagree	4	360 71.1 30.8 23.4	111 21.9 49.6 7.2	33 6.5 26.0 2.1	2 .4 11.8 .1
Column total		1168 76.0	224 14.6	127 8.3	17 1.1

Table 9

Values of Job Insecurity Variables - Q10

Q10	STATUS ROW % COL % TOT %	Active 1	Reserve 2	Retired 3	Other 4
Strongly Agree 1		224 49.4 18.8 11.7	59 13.0 24.7 3.1	162 35.8 36.2 8.5	8 1.8 24.2 .4
Somewhat Agree 2		363 58.6 30.5 19.0	90 14.5 37.7 4.7	154 24.9 34.5 8.1	12 1.9 36.4 .6
Somewhat Disagree 3		377 72.4 31.7 19.7	62 11.9 25.9 3.2	74 14.2 16.6 3.9	8 1.5 24.2 .4
Strongly Disagree 4		226 71.5 19.0 11.8	28 8.9 11.7 1.5	57 18.0 12.8 3.0	5 1.6 15.2 .3
Column total		1190 62.3	239 12.5	447 23.4	33 1.7

Table 10

Values of Grade Differences

in Job Insecurity Variable (self) - Q6

Q6	GRADE: ROW % COL % TOT %	Enlisted	Officers
Agree		507 46.7 80.3 36.1	579 53.3 74.9 41.2
Disagree		124 39.0 19.7 8.8	194 61.0 25.1 13.8
Column Total		631 44.9	773 55.1

Also, the issue of no severance pay for forced-out enlisted soldiers (while commissioned officers are entitled to it) makes it less costly to eliminate enlisted soldiers than their officer counterparts.

Currently Congress is working to authorize severance pay for enlisted soldiers, but the perception exists among Army personnel that enlisted soldiers are easier to eliminate than commissioned officers.

The third question of this study attempted to determine the presence of an inverse relationship between levels of job insecurity among soldiers and the perceived level of credibility of senior defense officials: feelings of job insecurity correlate to low credibility ratings.

The correlation of insecurity questions (6, 7) with the credibility questions (11, 13, 14) recommends the expected inverse relationship exists (see Table 7).

The negative correlation ($r= -.1393$) between question six and question eleven is statistically significant as well as the negative correlation ($r= -.1422$) between six and thirteen and the negative correlation ($r= -.2666$) between six and fourteen (see Table 7).

The correlations between job insecurity and credibility variables show that soldiers experiencing high levels of job insecurity display very little trust and confidence in their leaders and their ability to protect "people programs" from the budget axe.

Table 11

t-Test Matrix: Grade, Job Insecurity and Credibility Variables

Variable	Number (n) of cases	Mean (m)	Standard Deviation (SD)	Standard Error	F-Value	2-tail Prob.	t-Value	Degrees of Freedom (df)	2-Tail Prob.
	GROUP 1 - Grade EQ :1:Enlisted					GROUP 2 - Grade EQ :3:Officers			
Q6									
Group 1	631	1.1965	0.398	0.016	1.19	0.023	-2.45	1383.29	0.014
Group 2	773	1.2510	0.434	0.016					
Q7									
Group 1	631	1.0840	0.278	0.011	1.31	.000	1.51	1260.06	0.131
Group 2	781	1.0627	0.243	0.009					
Q11									
Group 1	631	1.7702	0.421	0.017	1.07	0.347	1.12	1365.93	0.263
Group 2	779	1.7445	0.436	0.016					
Q13									
Group 1	629	1.7011	0.458	0.018	1.05	0.532	1.11	1354.36	0.269
Group 2	772	1.6736	0.469	0.017					
Q14									
Group 1	630	1.8079	0.394	0.016	1.36	.000	4.90	1395.05	.000
Group 2	770	1.6961	0.460	0.017					

Table 12

Values of Credibility Variable - Q11 (by status)

Q11	STATUS ROW % COL % TOT %	Active 1	Reserve 2	Retired 3	Other 4
Strongly Agree	1	43 47.8 3.6 2.3	11 12.2 4.6 .6	35 38.9 7.8 1.8	1 1.1 3.1 .1
Somewhat Agree	2	237 53.5 19.9 12.4	59 13.3 24.8 3.1	140 31.6 31.2 7.3	7 1.6 21.9 .4
Somewhat Disagree	3	415 60.5 34.9 21.8	103 15.0 43.3 5.4	154 22.4 34.3 8.1	14 2.0 43.8 .7
Strongly Disagree	4	493 71.7 41.5 25.9	65 9.4 27.3 3.4	120 17.4 26.7 6.3	10 1.5 31.3 .5
Column total		1188 62.3	238 12.5	449 23.5	32 1.7

Not only is there anxiety present among the Army, the anxiety is fueled by a pervading sense of helplessness among respondents who feel that no one within the organization is really looking out for their interests.

In a sense, soldiers believe that the cuts themselves have already been made. The soldiers just have not been told yet whether their names are on the "cut" or "save" list.

Concerning the survey question whether or not soldiers feel they are receiving adequate information about the Army's long-range plans for the drawdown, seven of ten respondents feel they are receiving inadequate information concerning the impact of the drawdown.

What has developed as a result of this study is a three-prong problem for the Army concerning its ability to effectively manage change. Perceptions from soldiers thus far indicate:

```
           Low credibility among senior leaders
                         /\
                        /  \
                       /    \
                      /      \
                     /        \
                    /          \
                   /            \
       levels of  /_____\  lack of
  high job insecurity              information
```

Table 13

Values of Credibility Variable - Q11 (by grade)

Q11	GRADE: ROW % COL % TOT %	Enlisted	Officers
Agree		145 42.2 23.0 10.3	199 57.8 25.5 14.1
Disagree		486 45.6 77.0 34.5	580 54.4 74.5 41.1
Column Total		631 44.8	779 55.2

Table 14

Values of Information Dissemination Variable - Q13 (by status)

Q13	STATUS ROW % COL % TOT %	Active 1	Reserve 2	Retired 3	Other 4
Strongly Agree 1		59 57.8 5.0 3.2	10 9.8 4.3 .5	31 30.4 7.3 1.7	2 2.0 6.1 .1
Somewhat Agree 2		312 59.7 26.4 16.7	66 12.6 28.2 3.5	132 25.2 31.3 7.1	13 2.5 39.4 .7
Somewhat Disagree 3		351 58.0 29.7 18.8	92 15.2 39.3 4.9	150 24.8 35.5 8.0	12 2.0 36.4 .6
Strongly Disagree 4		461 71.8 39.0 24.6	66 10.3 28.2 3.5	109 17.0 25.8 5.8	6 .9 18.2 .3
Column total		1183 63.2	234 12.5	422 22.5	33 1.8

Table 15

Values of Credibility Variable (fairness) - Q14 (by status)

Q14	STATUS ROW % COL % TOT %	Active 1	Reserve 2	Retired 3	Other 4
Strongly Agree 1		34 51.5 2.9 1.8	8 12.1 3.4 .4	23 34.8 5.1 1.2	1 1.5 3.0 .1
Somewhat Agree 2		248 54.3 21.0 13.1	71 15.5 30.1 3.7	126 27.6 28.2 6.6	12 2.6 36.4 .6
Somewhat Disagree 3		443 60.3 37.5 23.4	99 13.5 41.9 5.2	183 24.9 40.9 9.7	10 1.4 30.3 .5
Strongly Disagree 4		455 71.3 38.6 24.0	58 9.1 24.6 3.1	115 18.0 25.7 6.1	10 1.6 30.3 .5
Column total		1180 62.2	236 12.4	447 23.6	33 1.7

Values in table 12 indicate that not only is there widespread distrust of senior leaders, an overwhelming majority of respondents (74.5 percent) believe people forced out of the service would not be treated fairly (see Table 15), again raising questions concerning the credibility of senior defense leaders and the methods used to trim personnel from the force.

Values in Table 16 reveal that enlisted members (80.7 percent) also were more likely than officers (69.6 percent) to believe people forced out of the service would not be treated fairly.

According to an official quoted in the Army Times ("Survey: Enlisted more skeptical," 1990), "enlisted members might have been more worried because current law allows only officers to get severance pay." While this may be true, a personnel perception from the field suggests that "enlisted people always get the shaft."

Table 11 confirms the supposition found in question two: enlisted soldiers are experiencing greater levels of job insecurity than commissioned officers. The results of the t-test are statistically significant.

Table 7 confirms the inverse relationship between a soldier's level of job insecurity and the level of credibility of senior defense officials.

Discussion

The meaning of such statisical significance can be found in previous research concerning organizations and

their ability to manage change in an era of reduced financial resources.

According to Levine (1978), retrenchment politics dictate that organizations will respond to cutbacks with a mix of espoused and operative strategies that are not necessarily consistent. He explains that when there is a wide divergence between the official pronouncements about the necessity for cuts and the actual occurrence of cuts (such was the case with the United States Army), skepticism, cynicism, distrust, and even noncompliance will dominate the retrenchment process.

Research by Cameron and Whetten, 1988; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; and Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981, adheres to the view that organizational effectiveness and survival depend on the ability of an organization to manage environmental uncertainty.

One such form of environmental uncertainty -- retrenchment policies as a result of shrinking financial resources -- has been the focus of this work.

Sutton (1990) points out that shrinking financial resources threaten organization members at all levels. This study supports this finding and suggests, as Cameron and his colleagues (1987) have done, that members at lower hierarchical levels may, in fact, often be more threatened by budget cuts than managers because of the tendency for declining organizations to reduce direct workers more quickly than managers (Freeman & Hannan, 1975).

This study reveals that enlisted soldiers clearly feel the potential budget "squeeze" more than their commissioned officer counterparts.

Although the reasons for this may differ from previous research, the results indicate similar findings. The nature of the United States Army differs significantly from corporate America concerning "direct workers" vs. "managers" but the inherent logic of the argument remains the same: soldiers, lower on the hierarchial ladder than officers, fear for their jobs more than officers do.

Sutton (1990) portrays a model of the effects of decrease in work force size (see page 36). It is here that the broader question of "what happens to members of an organization who experience high levels of job insecurity over the potential loss of their job" begins to be answered.

In this model, Sutton (1990) proposes three variables which influence the overall strength of short-term effects and speed of transition from short-term to long-term effects.

The first variable is the severity of work force reduction strategy. Severe work force reduction strategies are more threatening and the extent to which work force reduction is construed as threatening depends heavily on the means through which it is accomplished.

Greenhalgh and his colleagues (1988) proposed a hierarchy of five categories of work force reduction strategies. Of the five, the Army has announced it has

chosen to comply with the 25 percent reduction in force figure with a strategy so severe it did not make Greenhalgh's list: involuntary separations through some undefined (as yet) screening process.

It is this "involuntary separation" which has many soldiers so concerned for their careers. The high levels of job insecurity experienced by soldiers attest to this.

Without any knowledge concerning how, when, and who will be cut, soldiers are left with no choice but to fear for their jobs.

Second, independent of the severity of the work force reduction strategy selected, the way in which it is implemented can influence the amount of anxiety provoked. Work on layoffs (Brockner and his colleagues, 1988 and Greenhalgh and colleagues: Greenhalgh, 1982; 1983; Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984) suggests that the threat posed by layoffs, or other work force reduction strategies, will be exacerbated to the extent that they are construed as: (1) unfair; (2) unpredictable; and (3) uncontrollable.

The results display a perception that departing soldiers will not be treated fairly by the Army. Nearly eight of ten respondents do not believe people who are forced out of the military will be treated fairly.

By virtue of the fact that the mechanisms for performing the cuts have yet to be announced, the threat posed by the involuntary reductions awaiting the active force is indeed exacerbated because it is both (a)

unpredictable and (b) uncontrollable.

Moreover, work by Brockner and his colleagues (1987) offers evidence from field and laboratory studies suggesting that survivors cf work force reductions are likely to react negatively (i.e., have lower work performance and organizational commitment) when they construe that laid off similar employees have not been compensated fairly.

The Army, in danger of facing a resentful population, must be onguard against such dangerous after-effects.

In addition, work force reduction that is implemented in ways that are unpredictable in timing, magnitude and duration may accentuate survivor anxiety. Following Seligman's (1975) signal/safety hypothesis, work force reduction is especially threatening when employees cannot anticipate when it will occur, how widely the effects will be spread, and how many rounds of reduction will occur. Again, the Army must be cognizant of these findings while trimming the force.

The cutbacks themselves will have a tremendous impact on Army personnel forced to leave the service. If not managed properly, the after-effects of such turmoil will deeply impale survivors' views of the future Army with a bleak outlook -- a consequence the Army can ill-afford.

Of particular merit is a finding by Seligman (1975) whereby it was discovered that employees who remain after a round of reductions in organizations have little reason to believe that they will survive the next round of reductions,

and have no way of knowing when the next round will be announced.

What develops, according to Seligman, is an historical pattern which creates a constant state of anxiety and depression throughout the work force. In this vein, Greenhalgh (1983) asserts that a job insecurity crisis may be provoked when surviving employees become paralyzed by the stress of uncertainty.

Can you imagine an organization such as the United States Army completely paralyzed by such stress? What if, as a result of the drawdown, the Army develops leaders so concerned about the potential impact of their decisions on their careers that they become over cautious and demand complete information before they (leaders) can make decisions?

Will this "careerist" attitude concerning decision-making (so prominent in Vietnam, according to many) become the logical by-product of the drawdown?

These findings, as well as previous research, may suggest such a conclusion.

A discussion of the significant relationships follows.

Analysis of Significant Relationships

The strong positive correlation ($r= .6002$) between job insecurity variables (6:7) suggests the United States Army faces a population deeply worried that pending budget cuts will hurt their military careers. In a sense, no one feels

immune from the cuts. However, it is evident that soldiers feel the cuts would hurt the careers of other service members more than they would hurt their own careers. The natural tendency to believe "it can't happen to me" may account for the variance found between questions.

Table 17 indicates the results of a three-way ANOVA between question six (insecurity variable) and question 11 (credibility variable). Other dimensions, such as "status" and "grade" were added to determine other possible sources of variance; however, the results clearly show the effect the variable "job insecurity" is having upon the data. The statistical significance is evidenced in both the main effects and question six itself. All other sources of variance have been statistically eliminated.

In analyzing the strong negative correlation between job insecurity variables (6, 7) and credibility variables (11, 13, and 14), several significant relationships have emerged (see Table 7).

Correlations between question six and question eleven (r= -.1393) confirm the inverse relationship between these two variables. Essentially, it appears that as a soldier's level of job insecurity rises, his perceptions of credible leadership among senior defense officials falls, thereby creating a second problem for Army leadership to manage during the force drawdown, low credibility of leaders.

Upon analyzing the relationship between job insecurity and credibility variables, another alarming finding comes to

Table 16

Values of Credibility Variable - Q14 (by grade)

Q14	GRADE: ROW % COL % TOT %	Enlisted	Officers
Agree		121 34.1 19.2 8.6	234 65.9 30.4 16.7
Disagree		509 48.7 80.8 36.4	536 51.3 69.6 38.3
Column Total		630 45.0	770 55.0

Table 17

Three-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Test

for Q6 : Q11 Variance

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Sig of F
Main Effects	39.002	6	6.500	8.998	.000
GRADE	1.011	2	.506	.700	.497
Q6	30.398	3	10.133	14.026	.000
STATUS	4.872	1	4.872	6.744	.010
2-Way Interactions	6.004	11	.546	.755	.685
GRADE Q6	2.365	6	.394	.546	.774
GRADE STATUS	2.346	2	1.173	1.624	.198
Q6 STATUS	.148	3	.049	.068	.977
3-Way Interactions	5.052	5	1.010	1.399	.222
GRADE Q6	5.052	5	1.010	1.399	.222
Explained	50.057	22	2.275	3.150	.000
Residual	980.308	1357	.722		
Total	1030.365	1379	.747		

1,430 cases were processed

light: not only is there a high degree of job insecurity being experienced (77.3 percent), there is a perception that defense leaders are not doing a good job of letting service members know what their plans are for handling the drawdown (7 of 10 respondents feel they are not receiving adequate information), thereby creating a third problem for the Army: a lack of information being disseminated concerning the drawdown.

The question then becomes, is the lack of information from defense leaders contributing to the overall high levels of anxiety and job insecurity being experienced by service members? Information theorists (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Thayer, 1967) would argue that is exactly the scenario developing in this situation.

Shannon and Weaver (1949) hypothesized that the greater the uncertainty in a situation, the more the lack of information present. In applying the same concept to the present study, a soldiers level of job insecurity is significantly related to his or her level of information available: that is, a high level of job insecurity, is positively correlated to a high degree of uncertainty, or lack of information.

In accord with information theory, a greater number of messages to would be required to completely reduce the anxiety and uncertainty in the present situation.

The results of this study imply the overall lack of information may be responsible for the covariance found in

the high levels of job insecurity and anxiety being experienced.

From an Army standpoint, this might be a case of "any news (good or bad) is better than no news." Clearly, the hypothesis contained in information theory supports such an approach as a methodology for uncertainty reduction. The opposite approach ("no news") clearly works against efforts to reduce anxiety and uncertainty. This finding is particularly relevant to the communication student, for it displays the rationale behind a significant communication theory in a simple manner.

In analyzing the negative correlation between job insecurity variable and credibility (fairness) variable another statistically significant relationship is evidenced ($r= -.2666$), again confirming the supposition contained in question three. The results show that as a soldier's level of job insecurity rises, his perceptions of credible leadership regarding equitable treatment to separated service members falls.

The issue of fairness to those who are forced out of the military then is another significant barrier the Army must confront while managing change. Fairness itself, as presented in 14, involves the ability of the Army to equitably manage its plans for the coming drawdown. As of the date of this writing, the Army has yet to announce specifically how it intends to accomplish the mandated cuts imposed by Congress.

Soldiers perceive the cuts are coming, that much has been announced. The problem arises with the mechanisms chosen to accomplish the cuts. The Army is not in the business of laying people off or giving employees two weeks off during inventory periods. The Army, intent on meeting Congressional demands, plans to cut the force through reduced accessions, higher reenlistment standards, early retirements, and some form of involuntary reductions-in-force.

The latter is what has many soldiers so worried. Without an explanation for how and when these cuts will occur, soldiers fear for their job security. The anxiety caused by such uncertainty is evident in this study. Previous research also confirms these results.

The negative correlation discovered between insecurity and credibility variables is an interesting finding. While not surprising, it presents a multi-faceted problem for managing change. Clearly, Army leadership must: (a) reduce the anxiety and job insecurity caused by environmental uncertainty, (b) improve upon the perceived low level of credibility among senior defense officials regarding this issue, and, (c) increase the quality and amount of information available to soldiers regarding the drawdown.

The impact on the Army of such findings is far-reaching, especially considering the Army's up-front approach to managing change during the drawdown. The Army clearly wants to do this right.

Whether or not soldiers perceive the Army managing the drawdown fairly and honestly will depend, in large part, on the Army's ability to confront the findings of this study.

Conclusion

The results of this study show that: (a) high levels of job insecurity are being reported among soldiers in light of the projected drawdown; (b) enlisted soldiers are experiencing higher levels of job insecurity than commissioned officers; and (c) an inverse relationship does exist between a soldier's level of job insecurity and the soldier's perceived level of credibility of senior defense leaders (high levels of job insecurity yielded low credibility values).

Chapter 4

CONCLUSION AND CRITIQUE

The phenomenon of work force reductions via organizational decline can cause anxiety among workers. The loss of one's job can be threatening to workers. The threat is experienced as some degree of job insecurity, defined as perceived powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job situation. Moreover, workers react to job insecurity, and their reactions have consequences for organizational effectiveness.

One such consequence, as reported by Haney (1973), is the destructive nature of the cyclical relationship between low trust of superiors and low performance among subordinates. Conversely, high trust of superiors resulted in a constructive cycle of high performance among subordinates.

Although this study neither confirms nor denies Haney's (1973) findings, it is interesting to note the potential of such a destructive cycle to the Army. Would the Army ever reach a point in the drawdown where levels of distrust towards senior defense officials are so pervasive among soldiers that the distrust takes over and begins to produce

low performance among them?

The author does not believe so due to the strict, codified nature of the organization. But the potential exists for widespread distrust if defense officials do not appear to be fighting for rights and benefits of service members forced to leave the Army during the drawdown.

The model of Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (see page 44) focused on job insecurity as an environmental press -- an experienced characteristic of the individual's work environment. The need for security is explicitly included as an individual dimension moderating individuals' perceptions of threat and their reactions to it. Moreover, the model shows that subjective threat is derived from objective threat by means of individuals' perceptual processes, which transform environmental data into information used in the thought processes (Thayer, 1967).

It is when this information is absent which concerns the author most in this study. The nature of missing information implies that thought processes can not be completed, or, if completed, the processes are completed without the benefit of adequate information.

Goldhaber (1983) defines uncertainty as the difference between information available and information needed. He argues that if members of an organization do not have the information they need, they are more uncertain and may produce substandard products.

This study supports Goldhaber's initial arguments, that

members of an organization who do not have information they need are more uncertain. The study fails to confirm (or even measure) any relationship between information, uncertainty, and production of substandard products (or performance). To fill the void of inadequate information, rumors begin and continue to fuel anxiety and uncertainty until proper information is disseminated. Allport and Postman (1947) stated in their "basic law of rumor" that rumors spread as a function of both the importance and the ambiguity of the information pertaining to the topic at issue. A subject of high interest (such as the topic of this study to members of the Army) of which little information is known is susceptible to the spread of rumor.

Thayer (1961) argues the communication of information is essential to the existence of any organization. Without information feeding into, through, and out of an organization, it would quickly collapse. Moreover, Shannon and Weaver (1949) argue that information is of value as a means for reducing uncertainty in complex situations.

What this study suggests is that amid the high levels of job insecurity and anxiety being experienced by soldiers, the inability of the Army to distribute adequate information concerning its long-range plans may, in fact, be responsible for the covariance found in the high levels of job insecurity and anxiety being experienced by soldiers.

Amid this conceptual diversity emerged the rationale for this study: to determine if soldiers are experiencing

high levels of job insecurity due to the drawdown and to see whether soldiers believe their leaders when they say that "protecting people from the budget axe" is their top priority.

Three research questions were examined. Research question one -- what is the level of job insecurity being experienced by soldiers in the United States Army following the projected force drawdown? -- yielded very high levels of job insecurity reported among respondents (77.3 percent).

Research question two -- are enlisted soldiers experiencing greater levels of job insecurity than commissioned officers? -- yielded strong concern and fear that cuts to the defense budget will hurt the careers of all soldiers. However, over 80 percent of enlisted soldiers agree the cuts will hurt their careers, while almost 75 percent of commissioned officers fear cuts to the budget will hurt their military careers as well.

The finding supports previous research whereby members at lower hierarchical levels are more threatened by work force reductions than superiors because of the tendency for declining organizations to reduce direct workers more quickly than administrators and leaders (Freeman & Hannan, 1975).

Research question three -- is there an inverse relationship (high job insecurity variables, low credibility values) between a soldier's level of job insecurity and the levels of credibility of senior defense leaders? -- yielded

correlation coefficients between job insecurity variables
and credibility variables (see Table 7).

These coefficients indicate that high levels of job
insecurity do indeed yield low values of credibility among
senior defense officials, thus confirming the supposition of
a negative correlation between variables (see Table 7) in
question three.

Critique of the Study

Several weaknesses of the study suggest caution in
accepting the results. The most obvious criticism is the
use of an untested measurement scale designed by others to
produce research results. Emmert (1970) argues the weakest
link in empirical research is often that of the measurement
techniques employed by the investigators. The need to
observe consistency in measurement procedures before one can
infer the existence of a hypothetical construct is necessary
to have a measurement of consistency. One must ask: how
useful would a measure be if you could not expect to get the
same results with it each time you used it?

Moreover, it also makes it difficult to interpret
others' research since one would not know how much of one's
results were related to what was being studied and how much
was the result of fluctuations in measurement unrelated to
what was being studied.

While the reliability of the measurement scale used in
this study does not appear to be a problem, the validity of

the measurement procedure, on the other hand, is suspect. The extent to which the author is actually measuring the phenomenon stated in this study can not be confirmed by the procedure used. Recognizing this, the author presents the data at face validity and suggests the measurement scale be tested for its concurrent validity prior to subsequent use. The more congruent the measurements are with the phenomenon being measured, the more valid the measurement procedure or instrument is said to be.

A second criticism is that research using only one item to measure phenomena is very unreliable (Clevenger, 1964). This study relies on such usage only to a limited extent. The clustering of survey variables around the concepts of credibility and job insecurity tends to diffuse such criticism, but inherent in the data is the use of one item to measure such questions as "I fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt my military career" and "I believe defense leaders when they say that protecting "people programs" will be their top priority as the defense budget shrinks."

Third, the use of a non-probability sample inherently limits the findings of a study. In survey research, an emphasis is placed on obtaining a representative sample, or a sample that accurately reflects its overall population (de Vaus, 1986). Failure to obtain such a sample reflects a sample which would be biased rather than representative and, as a result, the conclusions could not be generalized to the entire population -- at least not without appropriate

statistical adjustments (de Vaus, 1986).

Judging from the levels of statistical significance achieved, such statistical adjustments could be made to the data to reflect more generalizable results. One thing in the author's favor is the large sample: 1,923 respondents.

Four, assumptions of interval data may be unjustified. Five, the inherent weaknesses of secondary analysis severely limit its methodology for research.

Future Research

First, future research on job insecurity, uncertainty and credibility are needed to enhance our understanding of the relationship between these variables. Second, the measurement scale utilized in this study must be taken apart and analyzed beyond face validity. Ideally, the goal would be to correlate the results from this study with the results of an accepted measurement procedure, with both measurements taken at the same point in time.

Doing so would establish the scale's concurrent validity and provide evidence that the phenomenon observed is, in fact, the phenomenon reported.

Third, this type of study lends itself to time-series analysis. What has been accomplished in this study in a mere "snapshot" of soldier's perceptions concerning the drawdown.

Interestingly, as events unfold which alter individual's perceptions, so too do research results. To state that Army personnel are experiencing high levels of

uncertainty, anxiety, and helplessness is worthless without qualifying the statement with some sort of disclaimer. For example: "the views of the respondents of this survey reflect perceptions prior to the deployment of soldiers in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm" provides such a disclaimer and must accompany this study to prevent the reader from drawing conclusions which may no longer be valid.

Times change and so do people's perceptions. Would the findings of this study reflect similar results on the eve of the beginning of the ground war with Iraq? What about now, now that the war is perceived as being over and the second round of base closures has been announced?

The usefulness of such a time-series analysis approach has proven to be beneficial to decision makers concerned with public opinion. Examples such as voter opinion polls and consumer satisfaction polls provide patterns of voter history and product consumption rates. Often, decisions regarding certain product improvements or candidate's position papers are timed to reflect the most opportune time of distribution. A time-series analysis approach to research provides the basis for such decisions.

Much has been written in communication literature concerning motivation factors and credibility (Maslow, 1954; Super, 1957; Blum, 1975) but little has been written concerning job insecurity and credibility. Hovland, Janis; and Kelley (1953) assume the various effects of a

communicator are mediated by attitudes toward him or her which are held by members of the audience. Two of these attitudes are trust and confidence in the communicator. Does the overall level of distrust of senior defense officials reported in this study have a bearing concerning insecurity levels? Could it be that soldiers fear for their jobs because they do not trust defense officials with telling them the truth about the impact of the drawdown?

Similarly, an individual may believe that a communicator is capable of transmitting valid statements, but still be inclined to reject the communication if he or she suspects the communicator is motivated to make nonvalid assertions. Perceptions from the field suggest just this. Soldiers perceive Gen. Colin Powell to be a credible communicator based upon images presented during Iraq war. Does this mean soldiers think he's telling the complete story of the drawdown, or is he holding back information due to the potential damage it may cause to deployed soldiers in Operation Desert Storm?

The complexities involved with information dissemination in the military are unique. Disinformation campaigns are a powerful tool in the hands of military strategists who realize their potential. History is filled with examples of such disinformation strategies.

More research of this nature will expand our current knowledge of the complexities of communicator credibility and job insecurity. The relationship seems adversarial at

first glance, but research is needed to support such conclusions.

Conclusions

The research questions posited in this study were designed to provide information regarding job insecurity and its relationship to credibility values of supervisors.

The study demonstrated that perceptions of job insecurity among employees brings forth perceptions of low credibility among their supervisors. In addition, this study supports previous findings which revealed that individuals at lower hierarchical levels are more likely to experience high levels of job insecurity than their supervisors.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

1990 Army Times Reader Survey

Service ____Army ____Navy ____Air Force ____Marines

____Coast Guard ____Air Guard ____Army Guard ____Other

If other please specify_____

Status ____Active ____Reserve ____Retired ____Other

Paygrade _____

Years in service _____

If not retired, do you hope to stay in the service until you become
retirement eligible?

____ Yes ____ No ____ Don't know

For each of the following questions, please check the response that
most clearly reflects your feelings:

DEFENSE SPENDING ---

1. Given the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the
   United States can safely decrease military spending.

Str. agr. ___ Somewhat agree ___ Somewhat dis. ___ Str. dis. ___

2. The active-duty military five years from now will be much
   smaller than it is today.

Str. agr. ___ Somewhat agree ___ Somewhat dis. ___ Str. dis. ___

3. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's proposal to cut defense
   spending about 2 percent per year over the next five years is
   about right.

Str. agr. ___ Somewhat agree ___ Somewhat dis. ___ Str. dis. ___

4. The defense budget can safely be cut by more than Cheney
   proposes.

Str. agr. ___ Somewhat agree ___ Somewhat dis. ___ Str. dis. ___

5. The American public has reasonable expectations about the so-
   called "peace dividend" that will come from relaxed East-West
   tension.

Str. agr. ___ Somewhat agree ___ Somewhat dis. ___ Str. dis. ___

6. I fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt my military career.

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

7. I fear cuts to the defense budget will hurt the military careers of other capable military service members.

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

9. The talk of large manpower cuts as the defense budget shrinks had made me less likely to want to stay in the service past the end of my current commitment.

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

10. Talented service members who work hard will still be able to have rewarding careers, even if the military gets smaller.

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

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11. I believe defense leaders when they say that protecting "people programs" will be their top priority as the defense budget shrinks.

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

12. As the military shrinks, I believe there will be enough money for training, equipment and modernization to avoid a return to the days of the "hollow military".

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

13. Defense leaders are doing a good job of letting service members in the field know what their plans for handling the drawdown are.

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

14. If service members are forced to leave the military by the drawdown, they will be treated fairly.

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

15. My service will bear about the right share of the burden of defense cuts.

Str. agr. ___   Somewhat agree ___   Somewhat dis. ___   Str. dis. ___

APPENDIX B

Headlines from <u>Army Times</u>

February 5, 1990:   "Budget chops 17,000 troops, but service promises to nail down care, training."

February 12, 1990:   "The 1991 Budget: the first step toward the future."

February 26, 1990:   "The new threat: A CINCS-eye view of the post-Cold War world."

March 5, 1990:   "The road ahead: TRADOC chief General John Foss charts the Army of the future."

April 9, 1990:   "Force-out help: proposals would provide job training, open commissaries, cushion CHAMPUS costs."

April 16, 1990:   "Easier force-outs? Pentagon plan asks for changes in personnel laws."

April 23, 1990:   "Army: we must have full severance pay."

April 30, 1990:   "You start from zero: German army faces uncertain future."

May 28, 1990:   "Basic pay: is it broke?"

June 4, 1990:   "Budget: still no deal."

June 11, 1990:   "Early-outs approved: 19,000 enlisted expected to use program."

July 9, 1990:   "1990 Army Times Reader Survey: The uncertain future."

July 2, 1990:   "Fastest growing career fields."

July 23, 1990:   "Panel: Axe 40,000 in 1991." "Nunn budget doubles force cut."

July 30, 1990:   "The drawdown: Budget results, round one."

August 6, 1990:   "Cut would target NCOs." Budget, round two: the cuts deepen."

August 20, 1990:   "A line in the sand: Desert Shield."

September 3, 1990:   "The heat is on: desert build-up intensifies." Reserve "call-up."

APPENDIX B (cont.)

September 10, 1990: "Stop-loss takes effect."

September 17, 1990: "1990 Reader Results: Career
Concerns."

October 1, 1990:   "War jitters: are insurance companies
changing their tune?"

October 15, 1990:   "Will we attack?"

November 5, 1990:   "More pay, fewer cuts, Congress oks 4.1%
hike, eases troop reduction."

November 12, 1990:   "Desert limit: 12 months, rotation may
be shorter for some units."

November 19, 1990:   "The second wave: reinforcements will
build offensive option." "Combat
reserves prepare for call-up."

November 26, 1990:   "Bracing for war."

December 10, 1990:   "Must it be war?" "Congress debates,
Bush drives on toward January deadline."